


# The Governance of Global Climate Finance

## The Management of Contradictions, Ambiguities and Conflicts in the Green Climate Fund



Jonas Bertilsson

**DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY  
AND WORK SCIENCE**

UNIVERSITY OF  
GOTHENBURG



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Department of Sociology and Work Science  
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UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG

Gothenburg 2022

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in the Green Climate Fund

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ISBN 978-91-87876-44-8 (PRINT)

ISBN 978-91-87876-45-5 (PDF)

Cover illustration: Jonas Bertilsson

Göteborg Studies in Sociology No 73

Department of Sociology and Work Science, University of Gothenburg

Printed in Borås, Sweden 2021

Printed by Stema Specialtryck AB



*Till minne av Rune och Maj-Lis Bertilsson*

# Abstract

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Global climate governance struggles with many contentious issues, often made visible in the annual climate meetings arranged by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). When these issues are delegated to climate organizations within the UNFCCC system and operationalized into climate practices they are often translated. Climate organizations often take on a technical role, making the contentiousness of climate issues invisible. The thesis investigates one of the major organizations within the UNFCCC, the Green Climate Fund (GCF). The aim of the thesis is to make the contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts around the operationalization of different issues in the GCF visible with the help of immanent critique, and to analyse how the GCF management of these contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts influence the aspects of global climate finance governance issues that become emphasized or subordinated.

The thesis consists of four studies examining the operationalization of different issues in the GCF. Study 1 focuses on what factors influence the design of the GCF stakeholder arrangement and how it affects the possibility of different stakeholders to engage actively in the GCF. The GCF makes a clear commitment to support the active engagement of diverse stakeholders. It is argued that the arrangement actually privileges private sector stakeholders. Study 2 examines conflicts around the interpretation of the GCF governing principle transformational change. Some actors in the GCF try to connect transformational change to a financialization of the GCF, while others oppose such development. It is argued that financialization might contradict country ownership, another important principle in the GCF. Study 3 investigates the GCF understanding of climate vulnerability. The analysis shows how the GCF emphasis on dominant logics such as science and market logics reduce the aspects of climate vulnerability that become visible in the GCF, and how the principle of transformational change is implicated in this. The aspects of vulnerability that become visible in the GCF are those that can be managed through calculative logics, while moral and political dimensions become invisible. Study 4 explores the inclusion of indigenous peoples in GCF through an analysis of the development of the GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy. GCF embraces the ‘traditional knowledge’ of indigenous peoples but indigenous peoples find it difficult to introduce a more holistic view of nature, while western science dominates knowledge production. The analysis also shows that the use of this policy in the GCF is limited, despite protests from indigenous peoples’ representatives.

Altogether, the studies show that the dominant logics discussed in previous research such as science and market logics play a big role in the GCF. What these dominant logics bring forward are aspects of climate finance issues that are manageable through calculative logics, while perspectives and interests that are not easily compatible with these logics become subordinated – often the political dimensions of climate finance governance. This goes against the GCF portrayal of itself as an inclusive organization that is responsive to a variety of perspectives and interests.

**Keywords:** global climate governance, climate finance, contradictions, conflicts, immanent critique, development, developing and developed countries.

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# List of Studies

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## **Study I**

Bertilsson, J. (Manuscript). Organising stakeholder involvement in global climate governance: the effects of resource dependencies and institutional logics in the Green Climate Fund. (revised and re-submitted to *Environmental Values*)

## **Study II**

Bertilsson, J., & Thörn, H. (2021). Discourses on transformational change and paradigm shift in the Green Climate Fund: the divide over financialization and country ownership. *Environmental Politics*, 30 (3), 423-441.

## **Study III**

Bertilsson, J. (Manuscript). Managing vulnerability in the Green Climate Fund (submitted to *Climate and Development*)

## **Study IV**

Bertilsson, J. & Soneryd, L. (Manuscript). Indigenous peoples and inclusion in the Green Climate Fund (submitted to *Environmental Sociology*).

# Abbreviations

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CO <sup>2</sup>	Carbon dioxide
COP	Conference of the Parties
CSO	Civil society organizations
GEF	Global Environment Facility
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPP	Indigenous Peoples Policy
NDA	National designated authority
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPP	Public-private-partnership
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

# Förord [acknowledgements]

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Att skriva en avhandling är en utmaning och att ta mig genom den här resan hade självklart varit omöjlig utan alla människor som funnits runt mig, både i anknytning till avhandlingsarbetet och vid sidan av. Jag vill börja med att tacka mina handledare, Håkan Thörn och Linda Soneryd. Håkan, du har handlett mig ända sedan min masteruppsats och din vilja att göra saker ännu lite bättre har drivit på mitt arbete och hjälpt mig att utvecklas. Linda, du har lärt mig vikten av god planering och hur man får saker gjorda. Jag är inte på din nivå än men jag lär mig så sakteliga. Jag vill tacka er båda för det stöd ni gett mig, framförallt under det sista året som varit intensivt, och jag tackar för ert tålamod när jag ibland gett mig ut på irrfärder.

Jag vill tacka de personer som kommenterat på avhandlingsarbetet under dess olika stadier och som alla bidragit med konstruktiva förslag. Jag vill tacka Mattias Wahlström och Doris Lydahl som kommenterade mitt PM, jag vill tacka Göran Sundqvist som var kommentator på mitt-seminariet och jag vill tacka Kerstin Jacobsson och Monika Berg som var kommentatorer på slutseminariet. Jag vill också rikta ett allmänt tack till alla andra kollegor som på olika sätt och i olika sammanhang bidragit till att ge näring åt mina tankar. Det är i dessa utbyten med kollegor som vi växer. I detta sammanhang vill jag också passa på att tacka doktorandkollektivet. Att dela erfarenheter med en grupp människor som genomgår samma sak har varit ett stort stöd och samvaron vid gemensamma kurser, doktorandinternat och andra informella träffar har gett mig många roliga minnen. Jag kommer sakna det.

Jag vill tacka de personer i olika formella positioner på institutionen som hjälpt mig lösa de utmaningar som uppstått under vägen, framförallt Anna Peixoto och Cecilia Hansen Löfstrand vars stöd har betytt mycket. Jag vill också tacka all administrativ personal som ser till att min och andras tillvaro på institutionen fungerar varje dag.

Jag vill tacka för det stöd jag fått från olika stiftelser, vilket har varit väldigt betydelsefullt i genomförandet av avhandlingsarbetet. Det gäller stipendier från Adlerbertska Stipendiestiftelsen, Forskraftstiftelsen Theodor Adelswärds minne, samt Kungliga och Hvitfeldtska stiftelsen.

Sist men inte minst vill jag tacka alla nära och kära som bidrar till att ge livet innehåll och mening.

*Jonas Bertilsson,*

Göteborg, november 2021

# 1. Introduction

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I was sitting in a lounge area at COP 24, the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) climate meeting in Katowice in December 2018, overhearing two people next to me discussing their experiences of the meeting so far. One of them said, and I am paraphrasing: it is peculiar, so many people, so many events, and still so little being done. This statement is telling and encapsulates what many participants experience at these annual climate meetings. However, this ineffectiveness if you like must be understood in relation to the complexity of the issue. It is argued that the particular problem structure of climate change makes it “one of the most ‘wicked’ problems of world politics today” (Biermann, 2015, p. 516). The stakes are high for nation states as it challenges inter alia economic systems, development and food production. The high costs of managing climate change lead to conflicts over burden-sharing and other distributive issues: who is most responsible, who will pay, who needs resources the most, will the resources come from public or private sources, what should the resources be spent on etc. These tensions and conflicts have made the “global climate regime tedious and fragile” (Biermann, 2015, p. 516).

Global climate governance is obviously characterized by many contentious issues that are difficult to agree on (Roberts & Weikmans, 2017). This is particularly noticeable in climate meetings arranged by the UNFCCC. The climate organizations mandated by the UNFCCC to manage climate issues, such as the climate funds that are the focus of this thesis, are still expected to operationalize climate actions in a satisfying way (Feist, 2017; Graham & Thompson, 2015; Hall, 2017) while facing the contradictions and conflicts that underlie these contentious issues. Tensions may also increase with rising demands, especially from the Global South and civil society organizations, for a more inclusive form of governance that recognizes different perspectives and experiences in the development and execution of climate actions. These demands originate from negative experiences of top-down governance by major development organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which to a large degree dictated what actions were deemed necessary in the so-called developing countries. The expansion and recognition of more perspectives and experiences are potentially accompanied by more contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts that affect the work of climate organizations.

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The existence of contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts does not mean that everything floats. The operationalization of climate funds still slowly materializes in working papers, working groups, decision basis, guidelines, templates, and practices. What will guide this operationalization and what aspects should be emphasized in climate finance governance are not objectively stated, e.g., aspects emphasized by developed and developing countries are not always compatible with each other (Feist, 2017). This means that some aspects will be prioritized and others subordinated in operationalization processes. However, this is usually not made explicit as it would reveal the power relations shaping these prioritizations and it could jeopardize the support of the many different actors that are involved in this complex and fragmented climate governance (Pattberg & Zelli, 2015). The often implicit ‘negotiations’ about which aspects are more important are situated in a context where an existing climate agreement or governing framework is to be operationalized, which means that actors take on a more technical role, making the contentiousness of climate issues invisible. Feist describes this phenomenon in relation to the Green Climate Fund (GCF): “The COP [Conference of the Parties] gave general guidance, but highly consequential decisions were still to be taken at the Board meetings” (2017, p. 97) and “despite the outwardly technical nature of the GCF negotiations – tasked with the Fund’s operationalization – the issues actually discussed were inherently political” (2017, p. 60). The postponing of politically sensitive issues may also continue within these organizations and create an ongoing conflict, even though it is not always clearly visible (Bracking, 2015; Bruun, 2017). Feist argues that “Instead, actors are assumed to consciously or unconsciously rationalize policies that are aligned with their interests and ideas by bolstering them with knowledge and lessons” (2017, p. 30). This may be understood as depoliticized strategic action where “Politics wears the mask of knowledge” (Torgerson, 1986, p. 39, cited in Feist, 2017, p. 31).

Building on these insights, this thesis examines which aspects get highlighted, and which aspects become subordinated in the operationalizations of the Green Climate Fund; what political dimensions these aspects carry; the role of power relations in shaping the operationalizations; and who benefits and who loses from this? What this thesis contributes are not specific ways to solve conflicts, rather it is a contribution to the question of how to make them explicit. It is about making the contradictions and conflicts, and the political aspects of these contradictions and conflicts, visible in governance processes that appear to ‘just happen’, almost imperceptibly through small operational steps, which nevertheless ultimately result in

a governance complex that affects the living conditions of numerous people in the Global South.

Through analyses of the GCF, it is also possible to say something about global climate governance in general. What patterns in global climate governance are produced, reproduced, or challenged in the GCF through the management of contradictions and conflicts in the operationalization of the fund? The reliance on dominant logics such as science & technology and market logics are well known and often discussed in research and in the general debate around global climate governance. Developments toward more inclusive governance that recognizes other perspectives and experiences is another important debate. Climate funds are central to climate change actions and climate funds will most definitely influence and be influenced by global climate governance structures, as is also discussed in the thesis.

### 1.2. Aim and research questions

The aim is to analyse the making of global climate finance governance and to make visible the tensions and conflicts related to these processes. More specifically the aim is to examine how the GCF handles tensions and conflicts in the management of various issues in the GCF, and what structural patterns the GCF is producing, reproducing, or challenging in global climate governance through these processes.

The overarching research questions are: 1) What contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts can be identified in the GCF? 2) How are contradictions, ambiguities, and conflicts managed by the GCF? 3) How does this management shape the representation of issues in the GCF; what aspects become prominent or subordinated?

To clarify, I understand contradictions as things which are logically incoherent. Ambiguity refers to different interpretations and portrayals of a phenomena, e.g., an ambiguous concept can be experienced as unclear or fuzzy. Conflicts in this thesis are both those conflicts that precede the GCF, e.g., conflicts of interest between the Global North and the Global South regarding climate management, and conflicts that may appear as a result of such attempts to manage these conflicts in the GCF.

## 2. Global climate finance governance

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This section will give a contextualization of the global climate finance governance field: the development of climate change as a global concern; the institutionalization of multilateral cooperation on climate change; the development of financial mechanisms as a central part of global climate governance; and some general debates and conflicts around global climate finance governance.

Since the late 1800s scientists have understood the relationship between levels of carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) in the atmosphere and the temperature. However, it was not until the mid-1950s that atmospheric scientists began making more systematic measurements of CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere, which was driven both by the “peculiarities of atmospheric science as a Cold War pursuit” with the aim of controlling the atmosphere (Howe, 2014, p. 45), and the development of more sensitive measuring instruments. Scientists were not necessarily driven by the geopolitical concerns of the Cold War but utilized these anxieties to finance their research (Howe, 2014).

New measuring instruments were developed e.g., by David Keeling who was hired by Roger Revelle, an oceanographer, to investigate interactions between oceans and the atmosphere. Keeling started his work in 1957 and noticed quite early on an annual rise of CO<sub>2</sub> levels in the atmosphere, which he presented in a report in 1960 (the Keeling curve) (Howe, 2014, foreword by William Cronon). By 1963, Keeling framed this as an environmental problem by making connections between CO<sub>2</sub> accumulation in the atmosphere and the growing concern over pollution, also addressed by marine biologist Rachel Carson in her text *Silent Spring, an exposé* (2002 [1962]), a text which articulated a rising critique against the proposed scientific and technological advancements of modernity (Howe, 2014).

During the 1970s, more evidence was building up on the connection between increasing CO<sub>2</sub> levels and the use of fossil energy. It became clear that the CO<sub>2</sub> added by human actions was accumulating in the atmosphere (Nisbet, 2007). A climate conference organized by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1979 stated that it was plausible that increasing levels of CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere will lead to gradual warming and that the effects of this could be detectable before the end of the century (Gupta, 2014). The message sent was that states must urgently prevent anthropogenic changes to the climate.



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This WMO event can be seen as the start of global climate governance. In the 1980s several conferences were held to discuss the problem. One issue was how much certainty would be required before taking collective action on a global level. To provide facts about climate change the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the WMO in 1988, thus institutionalizing global scientific collaboration on climate change (Gupta, 2014; IPCC, 2021). In several multilateral conferences and declarations that followed during the late 1980s it was recognized that environmental problems were the result of the industrial patterns of developed countries. This attribution of responsibility was not only connected with reducing the emissions of developed countries but also to assist developing countries with limited resources to manage climate change effects. The Noordwijk declaration of 1989 encouraged governments and international institutions to develop international funding mechanisms to provide new and additional resources to developing countries, i.e., resources on top of existing official development assistance (ODA) (Gupta, 2014).

One key event in the development of global climate governance was the establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. The convention is now a central hub of global climate governance with 197 Parties connected with the Convention (UNFCCC, 2021b). It is the UNFCCC that hosts the annual climate meetings, the so-called COP meetings. The Convention of 1992 further emphasized the need for support to developing countries, and stated: “The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects”. (UNFCCC, 1992, art. 4 para. 4). According to the Convention, this required that developed countries would provide new and additional financial resources and transfer technology to developing countries (UNFCCC, 1992). This is also articulated in the often-mentioned principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (UNFCCC, 1992 art. 3 para. 1). It was decided that the Global Environment Facility (GEF) was going to be the interim financial mechanism, or the fund, of the UNFCCC. GEF was initiated in 1990 as a pilot programme to assist developing countries with environmentally sustainable development (Global Environment Facility, 2021; World Bank, 2021) and was managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the World Bank, (Global Environment Facility, 2021; Gupta, 2014).

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Over the years there has been a proliferation of climate funds and the funds mentioned below are examples and far from a full list. According to Román et al. (2017) there are around 100 international public funds. Apart from the GEF, there are now additional funds within the UNFCCC, such as the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund and the latest addition, the Green Climate Fund. Outside of the UNFCCC there are several other funds, such as Climate Investment Funds administered by the World Bank, including the Clean Technology Fund and the Strategic Climate Fund. Within the World Bank Group there are also the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and the Partnership for Market Readiness. There are regional multilateral development bank funds as well. The African Development Bank administers the Congo Basin Forest Fund and the Africa Climate Change Fund, and finally the European Investment Bank has the EU Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (Nakhlooda et al., 2015). The upside of this proliferation is described as giving more options for developing countries to find appropriate climate finance sources (Gomez-Echeverri, 2013) and more possibilities for donors to find suitable projects, which could increase financial contributions (Román et al., 2017). The downside is described as an increasing complexity with a multiplicity of requirements and demands imposed on developing countries applying for climate support. This could challenge their bureaucratic capacity and their chances to obtain financial resources (Román et al., 2017; Schalatek, 2012). The complexity may also impact on the transparency and accountability of public funding flows (Khan et al., 2020; Roberts & Weikmans, 2017). It makes it difficult for actors in both donor and recipient countries to have a say about the way funding is “raised, governed, allocated and implemented” (Schalatek, 2012, p. 953). Some see the GCF as an attempt to centralize global climate finance under the UNFCCC and that the GCF will become the main channel for the distribution of public climate finance (Nakhlooda et al., 2015).

The sheer number of funds does not guarantee the transfer of sufficient resources to developing countries. There are several issues relating to the mobilization and allocation of resources, over which developed and developing countries often have different views. One is the balance between *mitigation*, i.e., actions aimed to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, such as the development of energy-efficient technology, and *adaptation*, which are actions aimed at reducing vulnerability to climate change effects, e.g., strategies to cope with drought. Initially, the ultimate objective for the IPCC (Dzebo & Stripple, 2015) and the UNFCCC was to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC, 1992, art. 2), which meant a focus on mitigation actions. The focus on mitigation was also reflected in

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early GEF allocations (Gupta, 2014). Mitigation is sometimes described as a global public good, whereas adaptation is considered a ‘local’ benefit for developing countries (Brechin & Espinoza, 2017; Graham & Thompson, 2015; Markandya et al., 2017). This description is obviously based on the interests of developed countries. By emphasizing mitigation in developing countries, developed countries decrease the pressure on themselves to mitigate their own emissions. Developing countries on the other hand are more interested in adaptation actions and since the mid-1990s have pushed for more adaptation support from developed countries (Brechin & Espinoza, 2017; Graham & Thompson, 2014; Khan et al., 2020). In later years there has been a greater commitment in the global climate regime towards adaptation, which is reflected in the development of funds targeting adaptation, such as the Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate Fund (Hall, 2017) which is committed to a 50:50 divide between mitigation and adaptation. The Paris agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) has somewhat ambiguous articulations. The agreement recognizes the importance of adaptation but it also states that “the current need for adaptation is significant and that greater levels of mitigation can reduce the need for additional adaptation efforts” (UNFCCC, 2015, art. 7 para. 4).

What counts as climate finance and what is new and additional resources for developing countries is another contentious issue. Developing countries want to make sure that there are new and additional resources coming from developed countries, on top of existing development assistance. The UNFCCC guidelines on reporting climate finance transfers to developing countries give developed countries considerable freedom to choose accounting practices (Roberts & Weikmans, 2017). Some discuss how developed countries may simply relabel their ODA as climate finance (Ciplet et al., 2018; Steckel et al., 2017). As an example of this conflict, a report by the OECD claimed that developing countries transferred USD 62 billion in climate finance in 2014, while an Indian report argued that only USD 2.2 billion was actually new and additional climate support (Khan et al., 2020; Roberts & Weikmans, 2017). Double counting of the same money is an ongoing problem according to Khan et al. (2020).

The ease of access to climate finance resources versus conditionalities or limiting allocation criteria is a sensitive matter (Prys & Wojczewski, 2015). Present climate finance institutions often emphasize *country ownership*, i.e., how climate organizations should be responsive to the needs articulated by developing countries themselves (Nakhooa et al., 2015; UNFCCC, 2015; Urpelainen, 2012). This is a response to the experiences of development politics in the Global South that often positioned these countries in the back seat of their own development (Khan et al., 2020), often ‘guided’ by organizations such as the World Bank

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and the International Monetary Fund. One way to enhance the voice of actors in the Global South has been to secure balanced representation in climate funds, such as the Green Climate Fund, which has 24 board members, equally representing developed and developing countries (Green Climate Fund, 2011). Another way to strengthen country ownership has been through *direct access*, which the Adaptation Fund introduced and the Green Climate Fund now also uses. Direct access means that national entities in developing countries can apply for funding directly from climate funds without having to go through international intermediary entities such as multilateral development banks or other UN organizations, as is often the case with development aid. However, direct access does not necessarily mean less conditionality. According to some research, donor countries and global climate organizations have continued to demand ‘good performance’ or ‘good governance’ from developing countries (Gomez-Echeverri, 2013) but what counts as good performance has been debated. Developing countries “have argued that conditionalities and performance requirements are both inequitable and burdensome” (Urpelainen, 2012, p. 14, see also Schulz & Feist, 2020).

Another matter of concern is what financial sources should be utilized to mobilize the resources needed to support countries in the Global South. It is a discussion about what role public and/or private sector resources can and should have in financing climate actions. The UNFCCC convention of 1992 describes “A mechanism for the provision of financial resources on a grant or concessional basis” (UNFCCC, 1992, art. 11 para. 1), which implies public funding as the major source. The Paris Agreement (2015) describes a mixture of sources. The agreement declares that Parties should mobilize finance “from a wide variety of sources”, but it also notes “the significant role of public funds”, and considers “the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation” (UNFCCC, 2015, art. 9 para. 3–4). Gupta (2014) argues that it became increasingly clear in the 2000s that developed countries would not, or could not, contribute any significant new and additional resources, and there were hopes that the market could fill the funding gap. Developed countries have emphasized the private sector more than developing or transitional countries, which instead have emphasized public funding (Feist, 2017; Prys & Wojczewski, 2015; Schalatek, 2012). Nevertheless, the private sector is now more or less institutionalized in global climate finance governance, as exemplified by the Green Climate Fund and its Private Sector Facility sub-unit, which was strongly called for by developed countries in the design of the Green Climate Fund (Pauw, 2017). Public funding in the GCF is to be used more as a catalyst to incentivize private sector investments (Cui & Huang, 2017; Gomez-Echeverri, 2013). There are some concerns

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regarding this development. One is the funding of adaptation actions which are more difficult to make profitable compared to mitigation actions (Betzold & Weiler, 2018; C. Clapp & Pillay, 2017; Pauw, 2017). According to Román et al. “Private finance has focused almost entirely on mitigation projects in emerging countries” (2017, p. 25, see also Pauw, 2017), while adaption funding from mainly public sources has been limited. It is argued that low-income countries “where adaptation needs are concentrated and mitigation potential is low, have problems to access climate finance” (Román et al., 2017, p. 25). There is also a concern that markets cannot provide for all the needs in developing countries. A civil society organization (CSO) representative argues that CSOs’ emphasis on profitability “fails to capture such intangible benefits as reduced vulnerability, improved social cohesion, conflict prevention and better future development prospects [...] so public investment is essential to improving the quality of finance and giving priority to the poorest people” (Schalatek, 2012, p. 955). At the time of writing, the COP26 climate meeting in Glasgow has just ended and the problems surrounding the mobilization of resources is once again made visible. The UNFCCC writes on long-term finance (2021e, para. 4):

The Conference of the Parties [...] Notes with serious concern the gap in relation to the fulfilment of the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020, including due to challenges in mobilizing finance from private sources;

This introduction ends with some numbers presented in the literature about estimates of climate finance needs, climate pledges and climate finance flows. There are significant uncertainties around these figures but they can still provide some insights on the amount of resources needed. Fankhauser et al. (2016) argue that the main studies suggest a range of USD 180–540 billion annually between 2010 and 2030 for *mitigation* actions in developing countries. Hall (2017) presents a couple of different ranges for mitigation: USD 175–565 billion in 2030 or USD 50–625 billion in 2030. Dzebo & Stripple (2015) make references to a World Bank estimation of *adaptation* costs. It ranges between USD 70–100 billion per year between 2010 and 2050. Fankhauser et al. (2016) describe adaptation-related investments in the range of USD 60–100 billion per year by 2030. Román et al. (2017) refer to a United Nations estimate of adaptation costs, ranging between USD 17–100 billion. Another estimation from UNEP talks about adaptation costs between USD 140–300 billion per year by 2030 and USD

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280–500 billion per year by 2050 (Khan et al., 2020). One can compare this with official development assistance in 2017 which was USD 120 billion (Hall, 2017).

At the Copenhagen and Cancún climate conferences in 2009 and 2010, developed countries pledged almost USD 30 billion as ‘fast start finance’ to developing countries from 2010–2012 and then USD 100 billion a year by 2020, from a variety of sources (Schalatek, 2012). This was also confirmed later at the Paris conference in 2015 (Román et al., 2017). Some argue these numbers are too low if they are intended to cover both mitigation and adaptation actions, and they are probably more a reflection of what was politically feasible than based on estimated needs (Román et al., 2017; Schalatek, 2012). There are challenges in tracking actual climate finance flows, especially from the private sector. Data must be compiled from different sources, using different timelines and methodologies and different actors use different definitions of terms (Román et al., 2017; Ciplet et al., 2018). There are some figures though. Román et al. (2017) present public funding flows of USD 35–49 billion per year between 2011–2012 and USD 37.9–43.5 billion yearly between 2013–2014. These figures are obviously far from the estimated needs described above. Fankhauser et al. (2016) refer to climate investments in non-OECD countries which have varied over the past two years (from the time of writing of their article) between USD 165–180 billion per year, from both public and private investments (mostly from private sources). Ninety percent is devoted to mitigation and most transfers were between developing countries themselves. Transfers from developed to developing countries comprised less than 12 percent of non-OECD investments (Fankhauser et al., 2016).

### 3. The case – the Green Climate Fund

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The GCF is part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and was established at the climate meeting in Cancún in 2010 (COP16). However, it did not become fully operational until 2015 when the fund approved its first set of climate projects. At the time of writing the GCF has approved 181 climate projects in total<sup>1</sup> (see Appendix B). Its mission is to provide developing countries with climate finance for both mitigation and adaptation projects, and to support developing countries in mobilizing private sector resources for climate projects. All parties to the UNFCCC that are categorized as developing countries can receive funding and support from the GCF (Green Climate Fund, 2011, para. 35).

Although it is a relatively new organization, the GCF has become one of the major financial mechanisms of the UNFCCC and is now the largest climate fund in terms of pledges (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2020). Due to its central position in global climate governance (Mathy & Blanchard, 2016) and the amount of resources it mobilizes and redistributes, it is a powerful actor with the potential to achieve structural changes across scales. The GCF states that it seeks to become a centre of excellence in climate finance (Green Climate Fund, 2020b), that it focuses on “being a global thought leader and a climate policy influencer”, and aims to “consolidat[e] the Fund’s role as the centre of gravity for climate finance over the coming decade” (Green Climate Fund, 2019a, para. 29a, 140). The GCF will most likely play a big role in the management of climate change in the years to come and is thus an importance actor to examine.

#### 3.1. The rationales for a new fund

Divergent interests are often a reason for the creation of new institutions (Gómez-Mera et al., 2020) and the GCF is one example of this. The GCF is one of the later additions to the global climate finance governance structure and various reasons are proposed in the literature as to why the GCF was established. As mentioned in section 2 above, global climate governance was predominantly occupied with mitigation actions in the early years (Chaudhury, 2020) but through increasing demands from the Global South, the need for mobilizing adaptation

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<sup>1</sup> Including projects developed through the Simplified Approval Process (Green Climate Fund, 2021d)

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finance gained recognition in the UNFCCC. The GCF commitment to split funding evenly between mitigation and adaptation can be seen as a response to this demand (Seo, 2017) and the need to build trust between developed and developing countries in climate negotiations (Hourcade et al., 2015). Although developed countries wanted to show they were responsive to the needs of the Global South, the 50:50 split was also a way to engage developing countries in mitigation actions so that mitigation was not only the responsibility of developed countries (Cui et al., 2014).

Another matter concerned relations of power between donors and recipient countries. Countries in the Global South and civil society organizations siding with the Global South criticized the existing climate finance structure, e.g., the Global Environment Facility (GEF) (Bruun, 2017; Graham & Serdaru, 2020), for reproducing unequal power relations between the Global North and the Global South, characterized by a similar top-down governance as found in major development aid organizations, often exemplified by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Under this regime, “donors expect to control project selection and demand efficient management and measurable results in return for contributions” (Graham & Serdaru, 2020, p. 687). Weighted votes are sometimes used in such organizations, where the biggest contributors, often wealthy countries, are granted more control over the way that resources are used in recipient countries (Graham & Serdaru, 2020). Countries in the Global South on the other hand do not see climate finance as aid or charity but as reparations for harm done by developed countries, due to their responsibility in causing climate change (Prys & Wojczewski, 2015). From this perspective, developed states have “little right to dictate their use [the climate finance resources]” (Graham & Serdaru, 2020, p. 687). The principle of country ownership was used by CSOs and actors in the Global South to argue for a shift in decision-making power between donors and recipient countries (Bruun, 2017; Chaudhury, 2020). The principle is that countries in the Global South understand their own needs better than global organizations and should therefore own the process of articulating these needs and how to meet them. Again, to overcome conflicts and to build trust between the Global North and the Global South, the GCF was designed to increase country ownership by applying equal votes for board member representatives from developed and developing countries and, as mentioned above, by enhancing direct access (Chaudhury, 2020).



### 3.2. Green Climate Fund ambitions and aims

The Green Climate Fund has an ambitious agenda which seems responsive to a variety of actors and their interests. According to the GCF, the fund provides businesses with an opportunity to capitalize on new economic growth areas following climate change, while protecting the planet at the same time (Green Climate Fund, 2021b); the GCF fosters “unprecedented coalitions between private investors, development agencies and civil society organizations to achieve transformative change and support harmonization of standards and practices” (Green Climate Fund, 2021b); the fund embraces the principle of country ownership and provides capacity-building support to enable a country-driven approach in which “developing countries lead GCF programming and implementation” (Green Climate Fund, 2021b); it embraces an inclusive approach whereby stakeholders, including developing countries, accredited entities, advisory groups, and observer organizations participate in the development of strategic plans (Green Climate Fund, 2021a); it promotes transformational planning that will “maximize the co-benefits between mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development”; and the GCF enables an active and effective engagement for diverse stakeholders in the GCF (Green Climate Fund, 2011, 2021c), including indigenous peoples that “have invaluable and critical contributions to make to climate change mitigation and adaptation” (Green Climate Fund, 2019b). This presents the GCF as an all-embracing organization that pieces together different aims, norms, and actors into a coherent and working unit. Coherence among interacting actors, bringing perspectives on policy objectives that are complementary or potentially synergistic, is considered a desirable state in organizations (Stokke, 2020), as is also reflected in a statement from Amerasinghe from the World Resource Institute, arguing that “The GCF is under pressure to be everything to everyone” (The Economist, 2016). This thesis shows that this self-presentation of the GCF as a unified ‘whole’ does not always correspond to what is actually going on, and it questions whether the claims made by the GCF can actually be achieved or fully realized. The studies included in this thesis show there are several contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts around the claims presented above.

### 3.3. Procedural arrangements

Global climate finance governance organizations are situated in rather complex multi-scale arrangements, so to get a better understanding of the GCF the following sub-sections will describe how the GCF is organized in connection with the UNFCCC, internally, and in relation to external actors, which include donors from the Global North, recipient countries in

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the Global South, the private sector, intermediaries such as GCF-accredited entities located at different scales, and accredited observers to the fund.

### 3.3.1. The Green Climate Fund and the Conference of the Parties

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was established in 1992 and has become one of the central entities in global climate governance. 197 countries have now ratified the agreement (UNFCCC, 2021b, 2021d). The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the decision-making body of the Convention and meets every year, publicly known as the annual climate meetings. One of the main tasks is to make decisions on how to globally organize the management of climate change, supported by reports provided by the IPCC. Another task is to review the actions taken by Parties to the Convention in relation to the decision being taken (IPCC, 2021; UNFCCC, 2021a).

In the Convention, industrialized countries are considered to have a big responsibility for cutting emissions and directing resources to developing countries so they can manage climate change effects (UNFCCC, 2021d). To enable the transfer of climate resources, the Convention established the Financial Mechanism under the UNFCCC, which will serve the climate agreement. The entities in the Financial Mechanism are the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which was the first entity of the mechanism. Other funds have been developed and added later, including the Adaptation Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund and the GCF. The GCF is now considered the major and central entity of the Financial Mechanism (Seo, 2017). In addition, the Standing Committee on Finance was established to assist the COP in its interaction with the Financial Mechanism (UNFCCC, 2021c).

The COP decides overarching policies, priorities, and criteria for funding in the Financial Mechanism, including the general framework for the GCF, called the Governing Instrument (Green Climate Fund, 2011). The Governing Instrument (Green Climate Fund, 2011) states *inter alia* that the GCF will promote “the paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways” [...] taking into account the needs of those developing countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change” (para. 2); that the fund will “pursue a country-driven approach [...] through effective involvement of relevant institutions and stakeholders” (para. 3); that the fund will “provide simplified and improved access to funding, including direct access” (para. 31); and that financial inputs will come from developed countries in the UNFCCC but also from other public and private sources

(para. 29–30). To enable an inflow from private sources the fund will establish a private sector facility that promotes the participation of private sector actors in developing countries (para. 41, 43).

The GCF is “accountable to and functions under the guidance of the COP to support projects, programmes, policies and other activities in developing country Parties” (Green Climate Fund, 2013a, para. 1, 6). The GCF submits annual reports to the COP that shall include inter alia information on the implementation of overarching policy priorities and criteria decided by the COP, information on activities financed by the GCF, how the GCF balances between mitigation and adaptation activities, how the GCF works to develop mechanisms for using and applying suitable expert and technical advice, information on resource mobilization, and reports of the GCF Independent Evaluation Unit (Green Climate Fund, 2013a, para. 11, 13, 14, 15, 17b, 20).

### 3.3.2. The Green Climate Fund Board and Co-chairs

The GCF headquarter is situated in Songdo, Incheon City, Republic of Korea and the GCF Board meets approximately three times a year, or at least twice a year. The Board consists of 24 members: 12 members representing developed countries and 12 members representing developing countries. Representatives from developing countries come from different regions: three members from the Asia-Pacific States, three members from the African States, three members from the Latin American and Caribbean States, one member from small island developing States, one member from least developed country Parties and one member position rotating between the regions. The members of the Board are elected by their respective constituency and serve for a term of three years, with the possibility to serve additional terms, if so decided by their constituency. Two-thirds of the Board must be present at meetings to make the proceedings of the meetings valid (Green Climate Fund, 2013c). Decisions should preferably be taken by consensus but if this is not achieved after all efforts to reach consensus have been exhausted, majority voting can be used:

If at least a four-fifths majority of Board members present and voting vote in favour of the draft decision, the draft decision shall be considered adopted, unless four or more developed country Board members or four or more developing country Board members vote against it (Green Climate Fund, 2021a, p. 527).

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Decisions can be made between meetings, if necessary, by inviting board members to approve sent-out decision proposals on a no-objection basis.

Although the GCF works under the guidance of the COP, the GCF Board has the responsibility to make decisions on which projects to approve and to develop the general guidance of the COP, e.g., environmental and social safeguards, more precise criteria for investments and accreditations, establishing a framework for monitoring and evaluating GCF funded activities, and establishing substructures to address specific activities (Green Climate Fund, 2011). The Board has established a number of committees and panels with appointed members from the Board that will support the Board in decision-making, e.g., the Risk Management Committee, the Investment Committee, the Appointments Committee, the Budget Committee, the Private Sector Advisory Group, and the Accreditation Committee. Panels may also use external expertise, such as the Independent Technical Advisory Panel that helps the Board to assess funding proposals (Green Climate Fund, 2013c, 2021a). The Board can also request the GCF Secretariat to collect and produce knowledge needed to further develop the fund.

The Board has two Co-chairs: one from a developing country Party and one from a developed country Party. They are elected by members of the Board and serve for one year. They are responsible for ensuring that the procedural rules of the Board and its activities are followed. Before the end of meetings, they present a draft to the Board with decisions that need approval by the Board (Green Climate Fund, 2013c)

### 3.3.3. The Green Climate Fund Secretariat, sub-units and mechanisms

The Board appoints the Executive Director of the GCF Secretariat and the Secretariat is accountable to the Board. The Secretariat is responsible for day-to-day administrative matters as well as knowledge production and knowledge management that will serve both the Board and developing countries involved with the GCF. The Secretariat has around 220 members divided between various divisions and offices. Divisions include inter alia the Division of Mitigation and Adaptation, which provides technical expertise and support to developing countries in their development of climate projects; the Division of Private Sector Facility, which seeks to engage the private sector in climate project investments; and the Division of External Affairs, which promotes the GCF as a viable partner in climate finance, e.g., in replenishment and other resource mobilization processes. Offices include the Office of Governance Affairs, which supports the Board in its decision-making process and in relation to

the COP, and the Office of Risk Management and Compliance, which seeks to anticipate, identify, and manage potential business risk impacting the GCF. The Office of Risk Management and Compliance seeks to provide assurance that GCF investments in projects comply with environmental and social safeguards so that projects do not compromise GCFs reputation (Green Climate Fund, 2021e).

The GCF has two units that are meant to enhance the accountability of the fund. The first is the Independent Evaluation Unit, established by the Board “to provide objective assessments of the performance and results of the Fund” (Independent Evaluation Unit, Green Climate Fund, 2021). The Independent Evaluation Unit reports to the Board and it also sends evaluation reports to the COP, as part of the periodic reviews of the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC. The second unit is the Independent Integrity Unit, working to deter fraud and corruption among “GCF staff, external stakeholders, implementing entities, and intermediaries relating to GCF” (Independent Integrity Unit, Green Climate Fund, 2021). The Independent Integrity Unit reports to the Board and the Ethics and Audit Committee. The GCF has also established the Independent Redress Mechanisms, which is mandated by the Board to address complaints from actors affected negatively by GCF projects, e.g., projects failing to follow environmental and social safeguards. It also “accepts requests from Developing Countries seeking reconsideration of funding proposals that were denied by the GCF Board” (Independent Redress Mechanism, Green Climate Fund, 2021). The Independent Integrity Unit reports to the Board

### 3.3.4. Donors and other resource providers

The GCF Governing Instrument states that “[t]he fund will receive financial inputs from developed country Parties to the Convention”, but also “from a variety of other sources, public and private, including alternative sources” (Green Climate Fund, 2011). There are no obligations for developed countries in the COP to contribute to the GCF (Seo, 2017) and hence the GCF needs to mobilize the resources needed. The GCF has had two resource mobilization processes so far. The first, called the Initial Resource Mobilization (IRM), lasted from June to November 2014. The Board issued an open invitation to all potential contributors, from both public and private sectors, and philanthropic organizations. Some meetings, such as the technical sessions, were open to all contributors, including invited non-contributing observers, while the so-called executive session was only open to GCF staff and contributors. At

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the High-Level Pledging Conference in Berlin, November 2014, 21 countries pledged USD 9.3 billion to the GCF.

At the time of the Initial Resource Mobilization process, the Board recognized the GCF needed a more formal replenishment process for the next resource mobilization round, and in 2018 the Board endorsed a new process for the replenishment process (Green Climate Fund, 2018b). The process is similar to the Initial Resource Mobilization process. For the replenishment process, the Co-chairs, as previously, send out an open invitation to all potential contributors. The process consists of two consultation meetings and a high-level pledging conference. GCF accredited observers from civil society, the private sector and a representative from the UNFCCC will observe technical consultation meetings whereas the executive meetings are limited to potential contributors only. In the GCF's first replenishment, 30 countries and one country region (Wallonia of Belgium) made pledges to the GCF. As of 21 July 2020 the announced and confirmed pledges amounted to USD 5.29 billion (Green Climate Fund, 2020a). More pledges followed later and in a press release on 17 September 2020 the GCF announced it had reached over USD 10 billion (Green Climate Fund, 2020f).

The replenishment process is first and foremost a way to mobilize resources from developed countries, even though other actors may contribute. In GCF policy documents there are no explicit rules on the possibility for donors to target their contributions for a specific purpose. It has been suggested in GCF discussions that donors may earmark their contributions for either mitigation, adaptation, or the Private Sector Facility in the GCF. Developing states have not responded well to earmarking since targeted contributions and their use would possibly reflect the interests of developed countries more than the needs of developing countries. As discussed above, developed countries have often been more interested in mitigation and developing countries more interested in adaptation (Brechtin & Espinoza, 2017). According to a study (Graham & Serdaru, 2020), some donor countries still expect to earmark their contributions. In GCF contribution arrangements with donor countries one can see, for example, that the United States expects at least 50 percent of its contribution will be used to support private sector activities. In a similar way, Canada and the United Kingdom have targeted their contributions for the Private Sector Facility in the GCF.

Larger contributions from the private sector are not expected to come from pledges but indirectly through market logics and the use of new financial instruments, such as green bonds, weather derivatives and other insurance products. The GCF believes that by using public resources to de-risk investments, the GCF can catalyse private sector investments in

new climate-change-related markets, both for mitigation and adaptation projects. The GCF states that “Shifting these wider financial flows managed by the private sector is key to mobilizing the scale of resources – in the trillions – needed to realize developing countries’ NDCs, NAPs and other climate strategies” (Green Climate Fund, 2019a, para. 102). For this to happen, developing countries need to include new financial instruments for the private sector in their project proposals, and the GCF has proposed that the private sector could have a more pro-active role in the development of project proposals. According to the GCF, the private sector may act as an advisor to developing countries to make sure they understand what makes a profitable case for the private sector (Green Climate Fund, 2018a). The GCF would act as supporters in these processes through the GCF’s many support and readiness programmes that aim to enhance the capacity of developing countries, e.g., regarding project development.

### 3.3.5. Accredited entities and national designated authorities

The GCF does not develop or implement climate projects itself but works through accredited entities. It is also through these entities that developing countries access climate finance. The Governing Instrument states that “[a]ccess to Fund resources will be through national, regional and international implementing entities accredited by the Board [...]” and “[t]he Board will develop, manage and oversee an accreditation process for all implementing entities [...]” (Green Climate Fund, 2011 para, 49, 45). The GCF says that it currently has a network of over 200 accredited entities, including “international and national commercial banks, multi-lateral, regional and national development finance institutions, equity fund institutions, United Nations agencies, and civil society organizations” (Green Climate Fund, 2021b). Accredited entities should annually provide a self-assessment to the Secretariat of their compliance with environmental and social safeguards and gender policy. Accredited entities are also responsible for submitting annual performance reports on their funded activities (Green Climate Fund, 2021a).

Accredited entities develop project proposals in consultation with National Designated Authorities (Green Climate Fund, 2020e). “The Board decided that [developing] countries may designate a national designated authority (NDA), in conformity with the Governing Instrument, or mandate a country focal point to interact with the Fund” (Green Climate Fund, 2021a, p. 60). The GCF describes NDAs or focal points as the interface between the GCF and developing countries engaged with the fund (Green Climate Fund, 2020c). The GCF

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wants to ensure there is a consistency between proposed climate projects and overarching national climate plans in each country, so there is a requirement that accredited entities engage with the NDAs in project development. Based on these interactions, NDAs make recommendations to the Board on how project proposals relate to their general national climate strategies. The GCF sees NDAs as a key to enhancing country ownership in project development. It is also a condition of the GCF that NDAs provide a no-objection letter for a project to become approved. To attain legitimacy for the no-objection letter, the NDAs need to ensure that all relevant stakeholders have been consulted about project proposals (Green Climate Fund, 2021a). As discussed above, to enhance country ownership, the GCF, like the Adaptation Fund, has emphasized direct access, i.e., project proposals from national, regional or local accredited entities (Green Climate Fund, 2021a) but projects owned by direct access entities are still limited and international accredited entities dominate the GCF project portfolio (Colenbrander et al., 2018).

### 3.3.6. Accredited observers

Civil society organizations and private sector organizations that wish to participate in the GCF as observers can apply for observer status and then become accredited observers. Applicant organizations need to demonstrate a “well-organized and administrative structure and relevant competence and experience”, and explain their “specialized scientific and technical competence relating to the Fund’s goal [...]” (Green Climate Fund, 2013b, para. 6b–c). There are two constituencies for observers in the GCF, one civil society group and one private sector groups. The responsibilities of observers include, inter alia: consistent attendance at meetings; commenting on agenda items upon invitation of the Co-chairs (although they are not guaranteed to be invited); consulting with other stakeholders; communicating the views of their constituency to the Board; and communicating information from the Board and related GCF entities back to observer groups (Green Climate Fund, 2013b). The GCF has decided that two civil society representatives and two private sector representatives can attend board meetings, as so-called *active* observers. Each observer constituency chooses its own representative and they should aim to get a balanced representation between developing and developed countries, between genders and between international, national and local organizations.



## 4. Previous research

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The main focus of this thesis is how governance is performed and it therefore mainly connects to research perspectives used to investigate the organization of global climate governance. However, the organization of global climate governance becomes difficult to understand without also recognizing other focus areas in global climate governance research that are integrated elements in the organization of governance. This becomes particularly relevant as this thesis focuses on the governance practices of a single organization and its management of different issues. Because of this, I will briefly present findings from different research areas on global climate governance that are relevant in relation to the GCF.

### 4.1. The organization of global climate governance

The organization of global climate governance is discussed in both ‘governmentality’ and ‘orchestration’ research. Research using governmentality often tries to identify overarching ‘governmentalities’ that shape governance, such as ‘green governmentality’, which established global warming as a major concern and was institutionalized in the form of the IPCC. Then came ‘advanced liberal governmentality’, which emphasized market logics and made it compatible with sustainable development. It also emphasized decentralized partnerships (Rothe, 2015). Accepting that climate governance is fragmented (Pattberg & Zelli, 2015), it has been questioned whether one can empirically and methodologically establish overarching global governmentalities. Such a perspective makes it difficult to discuss potential contradictions and fissures in global governance arrangements (Rothe, 2015; see also Walters, 2012).

Orchestration on the other hand is a framework that presupposes fragmentation in global governance and how interactions between actors are built on interdependencies among actors. International governmental institutions are described as lacking many capabilities to achieve the goals given by their mandate, “These gaps may involve regulatory authority, access to particular targets, forms of expertise, financial resources and other capabilities” (Abbot, 2015, p. 488). Hence, climate organizations enlist intermediaries to fill those gaps and they ‘orchestrate’ the intermediaries through different incentives and support actions. Such support is often cognitive and/or normative, expressed for example through guidelines (Abbot et al., 2020). The orchestration framework was originally used as a normative framework that attempted to identify circumstances and opportunities for innovation, learning,

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mutual adjustments, and effectivity in governance. However, research has suggested that orchestration is often a ‘one-way street’, with weak feedback mechanisms to the orchestrator, and the framework has been criticized for not recognizing power dynamics in the orchestration of governance (Abbot et al., 2020). It is recognized within the framework that conflicts may appear because of different interests but interests are often sufficiently aligned to manage these conflicts, otherwise the orchestration would cease to exist (Abbot et al., 2015). Some have used orchestration as a critical framework to analyse how orchestration is carried out and what effects it has, focusing on the “politics and power dynamics of orchestration, and the competing efforts undertaken by various actors to exert orchestrating power” (Gordon & Johnson, 2017, p. 707). This research identifies different forms of orchestration built on different logics of acquiescence, i.e., how orchestration aligns actors with different objectives, e.g., an ‘emergent orchestration’ that establishes competition, bench-marking and standards as norms to make actors “observable, comparable and governable in the context of climate change” (Gordon & Johnson, 2017, p. 703).

### 4.2. Democracy and legitimacy

One major focus area is how to understand democracy and legitimacy in global climate governance. The ‘democratic deficit’ in global climate governance has been discussed for quite a long time (Bernauer & Betzold, 2012). The starting point in these discussions is both normative and critical. Some advocate more of a deliberative democracy that could create a more inclusive governance (Dryzek & Stevenson, 2011). Others are more sceptical and argue that deliberative ideals must be assessed against the actual practices in governance. One problem is potential trade-offs between different aims, such as increased engagement and efficient governance (Bäckstrand et al., 2010a). Deliberative processes may become ‘sideshows’, while “material power, bargaining, threats, coercion, and brute force” shape the world (Stevenson, 2015b, p. 102). Another obstacle for more inclusive governance might be how climate organizations value the contribution of different stakeholders. A lack of human and financial resources among stakeholders has had a supposedly negative impact on inclusiveness in negotiations concerning sustainable development goals and how this might create a hierarchy of legitimacy sources, i.e., different levels of legitimacy are attributed to different stakeholders (Bexell, 2019). Some argue that hegemonic knowledge structures hinder the inclusion of more pluralistic views in governance. It is believed that western, male, capitalistic economic knowledge production promises unrealistically quick fixes without a

recognition of the deeper socio-economic root causes of environmental problems. Stakeholder participation is considered an instrumental tool, which conceals the underlying problem of contradictory aims (Mert, 2019). Some argue that current forms of governance focus on consensus and systematically remove irreconcilable conflicts (Blühorn & Deflorian, 2019). The reasons for this are allegedly to be found in the basic principles of liberal democracies. Notions of freedom, self-realization and self-determination, together with consumerism, have led to unsustainable societies, but environmental governance continues to enable these practices through ideas such as green consumerism and corporate environmental responsibility, which legitimize the value preferences of western lifestyles and do not address the problem of unsustainability. It is suggested that this ‘avoidance’ of the problem can be interpreted differently: either as symbolic politics that is intentionally deceptive, a theatrical performance by power elites who do not want any disruption of the existing order, or as simulative politics that help actors to ‘manage’ dilemmas around lifestyles and environmental concerns, through self-deceptive practices, e.g., green consumerism. However, these scholars seem to connect the problem to democratic approaches more than consumerism. Their narrative is that politicians do not dare to challenge people’s lifestyle in the West, which in the end could lead to demands for more authoritarian powers (Blühorn & Deflorian, 2019; Meyer, 2019).

### 4.3. Public-private-partnership

Another democracy-related issue can be found in discussions about the network modes of governance, which include a variety of actors from different sectors, often described as public-private-partnership (PPP). Discussions of PPPs are often connected with the role of non-state actors, civil society, and private sector inclusion in climate governance. Research shows that global organizations have been important for the expansion of this mode of governance (Andonova & Chelminski, 2015). Scholars show how PPPs are sometimes described as a more effective and legitimate form of governance, and as win-win arrangements where actors collaborate towards global common goods (Bäckstrand, 2010). Research is somewhat polarized regarding the merits of PPPs: “liberal-functionalist perspective [...] analyses partnerships as win-win instruments that can address the implementation and democratic deficits and legitimacy issues, and critical perspectives [argue] that partnerships reinforce market environmentalism and lack democratic legitimacy” (Mert, 2015, p. 293).

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Critical research argues that the logic of PPPs is built on consensus and like-minded actors, which makes it hard to include conflicting views and interests in PPP governance forms (Mert, 2015), and research shows that deliberative possibilities in PPPs are quite limited (Bäckstrand et al., 2010b). PPPs are also described as reproducing existing power relations. A study of the Global Sustainability Partnerships Database shows that the most vulnerable and underrepresented are not included in partnerships and that the balance of representatives from the Global North and the Global South is highly skewed towards the former group (Bäckstrand, 2010; Mert, 2015). PPPs are also described as biased towards private sector involvement (Abbot et al., 2020; Stevenson, 2015a).

### 4.4. Relations between the Global South and the Global North

Inclusion is also a focus of research about the relations between the Global South and the Global North in global climate governance. Some scholars argue there is an urgent need to address imbalances between the Global South and the Global North in environmental governance (Gupta et al., 2015; Okereke, 2019), which according to the scholars has privileged the priorities of the North. It is argued that governance has attempted to “paint a homogenized picture of a common future for North and South” and thus hides “longstanding issues of unfairness and inequality” (Okereke, 2019, p. 172). One major problem identified is that framings and conceptualizations of problems are mainly defined by representatives from the Global North. One reason is that representatives from the Global South are often outnumbered at conferences where important decisions are made (Okereke, 2019). An example of dominant framings is the emphasis on market logics and growth rate by the Global North (Gupta et al., 2015). Developing countries are described as deeply suspicious of entrusting the private sector to manage sustainability issues. Developing countries have demanded adequate and predictable financial support, but climate finance governance is described as fragmented and overly complicated, making access to climate finance burdensome for developing countries (Okereke, 2019).

Attempts have been made in global climate governance to enhance the inclusion of the Global South in the development of climate actions, for example by applying the concept of country ownership to the design of governance arrangements. Country-owned actions “are believed to be informed by country priorities and needs, hence promote climate justice and equity by ensuring that countries and groups that are particularly vulnerable to climate change are supported to adapt” (Omukuti, 2020, p. 827). The concept is critically assessed in a study

showing that projects are often biased towards technocratic solutions and use local actors in an instrumental way to advance particular development agendas that lead to a depoliticization of vulnerability (Omukuti, 2020).

#### 4.5. Market logics and the private sector

The growing presence of market logics and the private sector in global climate governance (Pattberg & Widerberg, 2015) is a recurring theme in many of the research areas discussed here. The role of the private sector has supposedly changed from a reactive role, often opposing environmental regulation, to a norm-setting role engaged in the design of climate governance, where a market logic is considered central to mobilize sufficient resources for climate actions (Pinkse, 2015). Global climate organizations such as the UNEP have contributed to the expansion of market logics in global climate governance. Some believe this has helped developing countries to highlight their needs, while others think that the market logic has compromised the relevance of other important norms and values related to environmental care (Andonova & Chelminski, 2015). A relatively recent trend in the expansion of market logics in global climate governance is the increasing financialization of climate governance. There are different views on this development. Some see the access to new financial products as a democratization of finance, while others see financialization as a depoliticization of climate actions (Keucheyan, 2018). Financial products can be traded as products by themselves, e.g., weather derivatives, meaning that investments are disconnected from the materiality of the environment. According to critics, this could lead to financial speculation and volatility in financial instruments that are used to mobilize vital resources for climate actions, which could in turn increase actors' vulnerability (Marsden et al., 2019). Some believe that the potential negative effects of such speculation have not been adequately discussed (J. Clapp & Stephens, 2019).

#### 4.6. Civil society

The role of civil society in global climate governance is often discussed in relation to civil society actors' ability to highlight socio-ecological conflicts, to influence agendas and to participate in knowledge production, as well as the role of social movement actors in democratizing global climate governance. Some CSOs have challenged the technical and assumedly apolitical approach to global climate governance, in which some larger CSOs have

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participated, and instead articulated political conflicts, e.g. issues about justice and equity in relations between the Global North and the Global South (Cassegård & Thörn, 2017).

It is suggested by both CSOs and scholars that inclusion in climate governance arrangements might lead to a co-option and deradicalization of CSOs (Bäckstrand, 2015; Cassegård & Thörn, 2017). Participation in PPPs may seem to support increased participation but the emphasis on consensus could also lead to suppression of conflicts and the political dimensions of governance arrangements. The degree of influence in networks is also related to the kind of resources that CSOs may contribute (Nasiritousi et al., 2016). CSOs may use their moral legitimacy as a resource to influence corporations and the like to act more sustainably (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2015) but it also seems that vulnerable and less resourceful stakeholders are excluded from PPPs (Mert, 2015). When it comes to invited stakeholder participation in climate funds, this is described as limited to desultory consultations that rarely have an impact on the work of climate funds (Schalatek, 2012)

### 4.7. Science and technology

Science and technology are central to the practical work of making problems governable in global climate organizations. One of the difficulties discussed in applying science and technology to climate governance is the tension between the seemingly objective, unified, and standardized ways of understanding the world that are emphasized in western scientific practices, and the recognition of “multiple values and sources of knowledge” in the production of knowledge (Beck, 2015, p. 239). One dimension of this is the boundary work that goes into delineating scientific work from policy aspects, i.e., making political dimensions invisible by portraying presented knowledge as purely scientific (Lahn & Sundqvist, 2017). Another dimension is how scientific practices restrict the form of knowledge that is deemed legitimate in knowledge production (Westskog et al., 2017).

Climate organizations often work across different scales, from the global, to national, regional and local levels, and local knowledge has gained somewhat higher status in global climate governance, exemplified by the development of indigenous peoples’ policies that aim to support, protect and incorporate indigenous knowledge in climate project development. However, it is argued that when science is used for managerial or standard-setting purposes, it oversimplifies and misrepresents the complexity of a phenomena and “systematically overlook[s] unorthodox, marginal or non-scientific viewpoints” and the efficiency of climate governance is then achieved “at the cost of eliminating some people and their needs and interests

from the managers' purview" (Jasanoff & Long Martello, 2004, p. 339). Some argue that science needs to re-examine its role in climate knowledge production and climate actions, and become more receptive to other forms of knowledge, which is described as a big challenge for science (Beck, 2015; Jasanoff & Long Martello, 2004)

#### 4.8. Conceptual ambiguities

Many climate organizations are using different guiding principles in their work and research on these principles is often connected with their ambiguity and its consequences. One example is ambiguity concerning the concept of vulnerability in climate finance organizations. Vulnerability is an allocation principle in the Adaptation Fund but it lacks a formal definition. It still becomes implicitly enacted in the formulation of funding proposals. When analysing such proposals, scholars argue that "there is a clear trend towards increased quantification and monetization in proposals over time" (Remling & Persson, 2014, p. 28), which leads to the exclusion of non-quantifiable dimensions of vulnerability, and there is little evidence that the Adaptation Fund prioritizes the most vulnerable countries. Others argue that countries exposed to extreme weather events do receive more funding. However, when it comes to adaptive capacity, i.e., pre-existing structural vulnerabilities, the poorest countries do not receive more funding, while donors instead tend to favour middle-income countries, maybe because they have greater capacities to utilize funding in an effective way (Betzold & Weiler, 2017).

#### 4.9. Research on the Green Climate Fund

The final section of this research review will describe and discuss research on the GCF, linked to the various focus areas discussed above. There are mixed findings regarding how well the GCF supports country ownership. Some think that the GCF has been generally good in strengthening country ownership. Some scholars link the identified problems more closely to national circumstances than to problems at the GCF level (Zamarioli et al., 2020). Others have investigated the role of intermediaries in the GCF and how they affect country ownership. It is argued that the dominance of international intermediaries in the GCF, such as UNEP and the World Bank, skew project proposals towards mitigation, contrary to the needs of developed countries that are more interested in adaptation. This is interpreted as a mismatch between outcomes of GCF decisions and its emphasis on country ownership. (Chaudhury, 2020). GCF's own Independent Evaluation Unit also asks for improvements in

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the role of intermediaries. According to the Unit, stakeholders in developing countries often think that intermediaries promote their own agendas rather than supporting country ownership (Asfaw et al., 2019). A study by Feist (2017), who examines interactions at GCF board meetings, may also be related to relations between the Global North and the Global South. The study challenges ideas about institutional learning and argues that most communication at board meetings, especially between representatives from developed and developing countries, is hidden strategic communication that uses embedded veiled coercion. Power is thus exercised indirectly to influence decision making in the GCF.

Studies on stakeholder participation and civil society in the GCF have focused on aspects that enable or restrict CSO influence. Some discuss in general terms how the ability to influence is connected with human and financial resources, but also how CSOs may enhance their influence by creating alliances with developing countries. The heterogeneity among CSOs, including different views on the role of private finance, is interpreted as a reduced ability to speak with ‘one voice’ and hence limits their leverage (Prys & Wojczewski, 2015). Bracking (2015) argues that CSOs and their views were slowly subordinated in the GCF by a hegemonic pro-business bloc. Its strategies included: “rendering the process technical and thereby limiting open political and democratic deliberation” (2015, p. 289); describing CSO demands as something beyond the possible; reframing radical-sounding concepts used by CSOs; and threatening with financial withdrawal if ‘wrong’ decisions were made. Bracking (2015) describes this last strategy as part of a neoliberal environmental governance that depicts markets as the only solution. Like Bracking, Bruun (2017) emphasizes processes that subordinate CSOs and their views, particularly their political perspectives. He argues that the engagement of CSOs was shaped by structural barriers that were built on the creation of boundaries. Specific problematizations were used to create an ‘intelligible field’ that defined what was relevant and what was not. Things that were deemed non-relevant became ‘overflows’ and were dismissed as non-realistic, not constructive or not allowed according to procedural rules. To increase their influence, CSOs slowly adopted a technical role. Bruun argues that “Several sources pointed out that replacing broader political arguments with technical and concrete textual edits had the upside of increasing the agency of CSOs in the eyes of decision makers” (2015, p. 123).

There are some studies analysing the guiding principle of transformational change in the GCF, which is connected with studies about conceptual ambiguities in climate governance. There is no formal definition of transformational change in the GCF and the studies analyse



how transformational change is used in practice and how it relates to the needs of the Global South and their self-determination, often described as country ownership. Winkler & Dubash (2016) find tension in how the concept is connected with both low emissions, which suggest a focus on mitigation actions, and climate-resilient development. They argue there is a potential trade-off between these directions and they see a risk that the GCF leans on the support of donors that are more interested in what might be a public good, i.e., mitigation, whereas developing countries are more concerned with adaptation and development issues. If transformational change becomes primarily connected with mitigation, this could restrict developing countries in defining their own needs. Winkler & Dubash (2016) argue that the meaning of transformational change should encompass different ideas about what constitutes transformational change, and that the concept should be defined and 'owned' by developing countries themselves. Boodoo et al. (2018) think that defining transformational change in line with what is 'nationally appropriate' could lead to transformational change becoming yet another political concept that is scientifically ungrounded and used to circumvent formal mitigation targets. Boodoo et al (2018) suggest using Transition Management and continuous learning in developing Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs). In that way the concept can be continuously developed and hence avoid becoming disconnected from the needs of developing countries. Their suggestion reflects more of a positivist perspective on how to identify needs. Kasdan et al. (2020) argue that the concept, despite the lack of formal definition, is still imbued with meaning. Transformational change is often connected with market transformations, how the use of new financial instruments from the private sector can help developing countries to finance mitigation and adaptation projects. Kasdan et al. (2020) also identifies other major themes, such as scalability, i.e., the creation of climate project models that can be applied to different contexts, Kasdan et al. (2020) argue that scalability as a criterion might conflict with adaptation needs that are specific and difficult to scale. If scalability were to become conditional for funding, this could hinder developing countries from defining their own needs, their exercise of country ownership.

### 4.10. Concluding remarks on previous research

As discussed in previous research, governmentality has identified overarching governmentalities and those findings are still valuable to understand major patterns in governance styles. The findings in this thesis can be related to an advanced liberal governmentality with its emphasis on market logics and partnerships. The orchestration framework is also useful in

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the way it emphasizes interdependencies and shows how organizations orchestrate enrolled partners, e.g., through guidelines, which are frequently used in the GCF to steer the design of funding proposals. However, none of the frameworks call attention to contradictions and contradiction management in the organization of governance. The orchestration framework recognizes the existence of conflicts but concludes that successful orchestration means there is a sufficient alignment of interests. How this 'alignment' happens and the power relations that play a part in this are not discussed. Some have developed the orchestration framework (Gordon & Johnson, 2017) and identified logics used to create alignment. The difference between the use of logics in Gordon & Johnson (2017) and in study 1 in this thesis is that they focus on logics that align interests, while I focus on conflicting logics connected with the realization of different valued resources, which also highlight how contradictions and conflicts emerge in governance.

I argue that contradictions and contradiction management need to be emphasized more in global climate governance research because they are an integral part of governance practices, and will multiply with increased demands for more inclusive governance. As mentioned, previous approaches to understand the making of governance are useful but need to be supplemented by tools that enable analyses of contradictions and contradiction management. This is where this thesis can make a contribution.

I think immanent critique is a fruitful tool to further explore how contradictions emerge and how they are managed in governance. The studies in the thesis try to highlight exactly this. The analytical framework presented in study 1 is a practical tool for an immanent critique, here used to show how resource dependencies and institutional logics interact in the design of the GCF stakeholder participation arrangement. The GCF portrays stakeholder participation as the active engagement of a diversity of stakeholders. In practice however, conflicting logics connected with the realization of various valued resources leads to a prioritization of certain resources and stakeholders that contribute to the realization of those resources. This framework could be useful not only for analysing participatory arrangements but also for critically analysing public-private partnerships and other arrangements promising non-hierarchical collaborations.

## 5. Analysing contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts in climate governance

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In this section, I present the overarching framework of immanent critique which I use to connect and discuss the different studies in the thesis, what they have in common and the differences between them.

### 5.1. Overarching framework – immanent critique

A general description of immanent critique is that it problematizes the relationship between the idealized representation of objects and the material world they supposedly represent (Cassegård, 2021). Idealized objects can be a social system, such as capitalism, or an organization as in this thesis. These idealized representations are defined as ‘totalities’ since they make implicit or explicit claims to represent objects in the world as a ‘whole’—undivided and logically coherent. However, there are almost always potentially contradictory representations of a system or an organization that may threaten the idealized representation. Contradictions can be managed through the concealment of contradictions, which may take the form of a pretence or simulative recognition of different representations (Jaeggi, 2015) but which in practice subsume and pacify some of these representations. An example of this is how capitalism is faced with critique for not being compatible with environmental sustainability, that continuous economic growth and associated consumption will lead to a degradation of nature and the climate. As a response, capitalism reinvents itself through the concept of *green growth* (Hickel & Kallis, 2020), which is the idealized representation of capitalism in the climate change era. Corporations adopt values and norms such as ‘sustainability’ and frame themselves as ‘green’, but in practice this involves either symbolic gestures by individual businesses, so-called greenwashing, or insufficient actions at the economic systemic level to meet the needs of the environment (Rockström, 2019). This concealment makes it possible to represent capitalism and its relationship to the environment as a harmonious totality, which despite environmental concerns legitimizes capitalism as a sustainable functional system, and this is the ideological dimension of contradiction concealment. Cassegård (2021) cites Adorno, arguing that “the whole is the false” and it can only be viewed as a unit by concealing its own contradictions, and Gunderson describes ideology as a “reconciliation of real

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contradictions in consciousness, but not in reality” (2017, p. 268). Such reconciliation in mind but not in practice obviously privileges those that benefit from such concealments of contradictions (Gunderson, 2017), which means that immanent critique is also a method for analysing power relations and domination (Cassegård, 2021). Finlayson refers to Adorno and says that “The unity of the whole is achieved at the price of violence perpetrated against the particulars and that violence, as we shall see, is not just an innocent conceptual violence” (2014, p. 1159).

Within Marxism, the object of analysis by immanent critique has been the capitalistic system and its contradictory internal logic. Some also discuss the need to expand the idea of possible contradictions in relation to capitalism. Jaeggi (2015) argues that ideology critique can no longer be limited to one central contradiction but must take into consideration the multiplication of contradictions, and Fraser (Fraser & Jaeggi, 2018) makes a distinction between *intra-realm* contradictions that are internal to the capitalistic system, and *inter-realm* contradictions that also include ‘lifeworlds’ that contain their own characteristic and, at least partly, independent norms and ideals. As a result, contradictions may also appear between the economic system and the non-economic spheres. The contradictions and conflicts that are discussed in this thesis are inter-realm contradictions where different logics collide in the governance of the GCF.

By problematizing such concealments of contradictions, the criteria for judging social systems or organizations become the internal standards set up by the social system or organization itself, its ability or inability to meet its claims to represent an object. Finlayson cites Hegel, arguing that “The genuine refutation must penetrate the opponent’s stronghold and meet him on his own ground. No advantage is gained by attacking him somewhere else and meeting him where he is not” (2014, p. 1148). Thus, immanent critique does not use external principles to evaluate social systems. The argument is that such principles cannot fully capture the particularities of specific situations. Instead, it relies on the actual principles used in particular social processes that are investigated (Stahl, 2017). However, Cassegård (2021) warns against applying the criteria of only using internal principles too strictly. To avoid simply replicating the inside of systems and risk portraying them as more coherent than they are, critique also has to transcend this strict internal sphere, not by incorporating external principles, but by allowing the object, i.e., the system, the organization or whatever object is represented, to become visible in other ways, through other felt experiences of the object than those represented in a reductive ‘totality’. This leads into the ontological and epistemological

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perspectives of immanent critique. There are different views on this but I sympathize with the perspective discussed and developed by Cassegård (2021) in his discussion of the Frankfurt School, and particularly Adorno.

According to Cassegård (2021), Adorno rejects a naïve realism, presuming that the concepts used to describe reality also *represent* reality, the true rendering of an object. Such realism dismisses the idea that our understanding of the world is in any way mediated by the social and the historical context. At the same time, Adorno rejects a strict constructivism. We cannot convincingly describe the world completely as we please, or make it as we please, and so “concepts are not everything” (Cassegård, 2021, p. 51). To relate to both these dimensions, i.e., the world as something real and at the same time socially constructed, Adorno developed the notions of *the primacy of the object* and *natural history*. The first notion describes nature as something more than the concept used to depict it, i.e., the independent material properties and material force of nature that can never be fully captured in systems of thought. The second notion describes our relationship with nature as socially constructed (Cassegård, 2021). Again, the concepts of economic growth and green growth can be used as an example of how these two dimensions meet and become intertwined. Economic growth has legitimized an exploitation of nature which has created many of the problems mentioned above. When nature ‘strikes back’ against this exploitation, clearly visible through climate change, the idea of green growth is used to portray capitalism as having a more functional relationship with nature, which is debatable (Gunderson, 2017; Hickel & Kallis, 2020). This new economic discourse might hinder or at least delay necessary changes (Rockström, 2019), which will have material consequences for the environment. This is an example of how the social world of discourse and the material world are constantly interweaving.

At the beginning of this section, I described idealized representations of objects, which could be a social system such as capitalism, or an organization. Objects can be almost anything according to Cassegård (2021). He mentions artwork, incidents, phenomena such as climate change and even immaterial things such as memories. The meaning of objects is mediated through conceptual chains, and as they expand, so too does our understanding of an object. Cassegård (2021) gives the example of mercury poisoning. His understanding is influenced by a variety of things, e.g., medical definitions, the different experiences of victims and mourning survivors, struggles in court, desperate protesters, dead fish and poverty-stricken fisherman. All these parts or concepts, based on experiences of the object, play a role in the understanding of mercury poisoning and should be recognized to do justice to such

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an object (Cassegård, 2021). As vital as these parts or concepts are for our understanding, they could also make the object complex, so that it loses its coherence and even becomes contradictory. The way climate governance organizations handle such events is often by reducing the complexity and downplaying perspectives that might challenge perspectives that are preferred or taken for granted, and so it turns into an idealized representation of the object. One reason is to create easily demarcated regulatory objects that can be governed with predictable results (Taylor, 2014). Making these contradictions visible is central to Adorno. They reveal both power and domination, and how contradictions can act as destabilizers and prevent attempts at closure of an object, which would limit our understanding of the object. You might argue that it is impossible to capture all dimensions of an object and that it is necessary to simplify it in order to enable governance. That is true, but the problem is when alternative perspectives are removed from consideration right from the start.

The emphasis on the felt experience of objects, e.g., suffering, pain or shock, is important for Adorno according to Cassegård (2021). As I interpret this, the emphasis on experience protects against relativism and reductive conceptual abstractions of objects. Climate change is already causing felt experiences and will increasingly do so, but this is not necessarily reflected in calculative methodologies used in climate governance, e.g., incremental cost calculations (study 3) that exclude pre-existing vulnerabilities such as poverty, which greatly affect people's adaptive capacity and suffering. The point is not that felt experiences are more important than other representations of an object. Cassegård (2021) argues that scientific contributions are important but the problem is when dominant logics are used as the only legitimate sources for making representations of objects: Cassegård writes: "Epistemologically, experience of the object provides a way to see through the lie of identity [absolute or idealized representations of objects] and break through the closure of the system" (2021, p. 56). The world cannot be fully captured by conceptual thinking according to Adorno but by adding more pieces, more experiences of an object, it can become more real, or less reduced, which leads to Adorno's concept of *constellations* (Cassegård, 2021).

Constellations are made up of concepts that encircle the object, illuminating it from various directions without being fixed in a logical relationship to each other. What keeps them together is their ability to illuminate the contradictory nature of the object [...] The movement between the heterogeneous elements in a constellation may be destructive from the standpoint of the criticized system but has the

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positive aim of doing justice to the experience of the object in a way that doesn't relinquish conceptual thinking (Cassegård, 2021, pp. 24, 126)

This can be connected with the example that Cassegård (2021) gives about a fuller understanding of mercury poisoning by incorporating more experiences of the object. So, although the heterogeneous elements and felt experiences are not necessarily recognized by dominant logics, they can still be considered internal principles in the sense that they relate to the object itself. It is organizations and their reliance on dominant logics that makes these experiences invisible through the concealment of contradictions. The *object* is the key here and that is why Adorno talks about the 'primacy of the object'. It is the object and the concealment of contradictions connected with the representation of an object that can tell us something about the making of totalities, and the role of power and domination.

### 5.2. The Green Climate Fund in the light of immanent critique

In this section I will discuss how the studies in the thesis can be read in the light of immanent critique. A common feature of the studies is that they all discuss what I consider to be problematic representations of objects in the GCF, e.g., how the representation of stakeholder participation or vulnerability privilege certain aspects and subsume others. This can be related to the idea of criticizing 'totalities' in immanent critique, the idealized representation of objects that conceals the contradictions that exist around different objects. The aim has been to deconstruct and problematize these representations. Since this thesis focuses on the governance practices of one single organization and its management of different issues, it uses slightly different analytical tools to capture what is happening in the empirical material. It is still conceptually coherent in the sense that all theories and analytical approaches are chosen because they can help to break down or deconstruct these totalities and reveal the concealment of contradictions and its effects. Below I will discuss the different studies in more detail.

The theoretical framework in study 1 uses a combination of *dependency theory* (Rhodes, 2007) and *institutional logics*, the latter defined as a set of principles that tell actors how to act in order to accomplish favourable results in a social sphere (Greenwood et al., 2011). I argue that dependencies and institutional logics are two basic mechanisms that introduce contradictions and conflicts into organizations.

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The GCF is dependent on different stakeholders as they provide the fund with resources it cannot produce itself, both material and immaterial. Democratic legitimacy as an immaterial and normative resource for the GCF can be realized through stakeholder representation and organizational transparency so stakeholders can perform a watchdog function. Stakeholder representation and organizational transparency are then institutional logics that help to realize democratic legitimacy in the GCF. Financial means, as a material resource, can be realized with the help of private sector stakeholders using market logics. However, the logics connected with the realization of valued resources are not always compatible with each other and they might interfere with the realization of other resources. This can be related to Fraser's (Fraser & Jaeggi, 2018) discussion about inter-realm contradictions mentioned in the previous section.

Both democratic legitimacy and financial means are obviously important resources for the GCF, but in the organization of stakeholders in the GCF, financial means, market logics and private sector stakeholder are clearly more valued, which affects how stakeholders are organized in the GCF. The GCF is part of the UNFCCC but replaced the UNFCCC's established nine-constituency model for stakeholder participation and reduced it to two. The private sector was the only constituency left alone and all other stakeholder groups were assembled into a 'civil society' constituency. This clearly privileges private sector stakeholders and makes it more difficult for other stakeholder groups to get their particular perspectives through in the larger civil society group. A broad representation of stakeholders would enhance democratic legitimacy and move towards Adorno's idea of constellations (Cassegård, 2021), whereby a variety of different felt experiences from various actors can contribute to a more comprehensive representation of the objects discussed in the GCF. This is not to say that contradiction concealment would cease to exist by reintroducing the nine-constituency model in the GCF, but the reduction of constituencies raises yet another obstacle to making different felt experiences visible.

A broad representation of stakeholders through several constituency groups would likely increase political demands on the GCF and challenge the institutional efficiency and the operationalization of the fund. It could also increase the critique against the role of private sector in GCF, of which many CSOs are critical. A private sector representative in the GCF has openly criticized the fund for being overly political and has advocated a depoliticized management of the fund. Hence, the GCF does not want to jeopardize the exchange with the private sector, so to control potential conflicts that would challenge the private sector



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involvement, the GCF subsumes and pacifies stakeholders from civil society in the larger CSO group. The GCF statement that “The active engagement of diverse stakeholders is in the DNA of the Green Climate Fund” (Green Climate Fund, 2021c) is a form of contradiction concealment since the GCF actually reduces the possibility for diverse stakeholders to articulate their particular concerns by creating a two-constituency model.

In study 2, we analyse the guiding principle of *transformational change* in the GCF, using the analytical concept of *empty signifier* (Laclau, 2005; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). A signifier is empty in the sense that it is not fixed and sometimes incorporates ambiguous elements that allow a variety of actors to gather around something but without changing the power relations that exist in a social order. It acts as a stabilizer by absorbing and dampening potential conflicts. In this sense it is similar to the way immanent critique describes contradiction concealment and how the ‘big picture’ of unity prevails, despite heterogeneity, contradictions and conflicts.

Although there is no formal definition of transformational change in the GCF it is often connected with discussions about the need for applicants (countries in the Global South) to include new and innovative financial instruments in their funding proposals that can incentivize investments from the private sector. Financial support in the form of grants and concessional loans are instead described as business-as-usual. The GCF solution is to provide clearer guidance and capacity-building to developing countries which could improve the ‘quality’ of proposals and enhance their transformational potential. Developing countries react by accusing the GCF of being overly prescriptive towards developing countries and highlighting how this violates another embraced principle in the GCF, *country ownership*, i.e., it is developing countries themselves that should define their needs in project proposals.

The GCF finds itself in an awkward position between top-down governance and the embracement of country ownership. The concealment of this contradiction appears through assurances about the transformational objective as not conflicting with country ownership. Another more elaborate strategy to conceal the contradiction is to portray a financialization of developing countries, not only as compatible with country ownership, but as a flexible response to the needs of developing countries, although there is no evidence that developed countries have asked for these new financial instruments.

In study 3 I analyse how vulnerability is turned into a regulatory object and the dominant perspectives that shape which aspects of vulnerability become visible and invisible in the GCF. The study uses Jasanoff’s *co-production* approach, which can be used to problematize

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that which becomes repressed and subsumed in the representation of objects, often by dominant logics such as science, which according to Jasanoff continues to separate “nature, facts, objectivity, reason and policy from those of culture, values, subjectivity, emotion and politics” (2004, p. 3).

One of the major tasks for the GCF is to provide support for those that are particularly vulnerable to climate change, but the emphasis on calculative logics in the GCF subsumes important aspects of vulnerability, including the normative, ethical and political dimensions. One example is the use of insurance, which is based on risk management and the quantification of vulnerability aspects. Other non-quantifiable aspects of vulnerability become invisible. The economic logic of insurance could also conflict with the GCF’s commitment to support those particularly vulnerable to climate change. If climate change leads to more frequent and worsening weather effects, the insurance premiums become too expensive for those seeking insurance and it becomes less profitable for the insurance companies, leading to the withdrawal of the insurance business from such affected areas and populations, which is recognized as a risk by the GCF. This would obviously leave those particularly vulnerable to climate change without protection. Concealment can take many forms and one approach is simply to ignore contradictions (Gunderson, 2017), which seems to be the case here. Despite the risks of relying on insurance, the GCF continues to promote insurance as a good adaptation strategy.

Finally, in study 4 we analyse the role of indigenous peoples in the GCF and the potential for *epistemic belonging*. Epistemic belonging describes the mutual recognition among expert communities and the circumstances that enable them to enact their epistemic practices, especially those whose knowledge contributions have been devalued, e.g., indigenous knowledge. This can be related to Cassegård’s (2021) discussion on Adorno’s constellations. Cassegård (2021) argues that a broad representation of objects, enabled by different outlooks and different felt experiences, makes objects more complex and potentially contradictory, but also richer and truer to the complexity of the object.

We analyse the possibilities of epistemic belonging in relation to the development of and use of the GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy (IPP). The policy emphasizes the importance of recognizing the traditional knowledge and practices of indigenous peoples, but in other documents the GCF emphasizes the foundational role of evidence-based and scientific practices in the work of the GCF. These different outlooks on knowledge and the relevance of different sorts of knowledge could potentially lead to contradictions and conflicts. Some of these

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conflicts are visible in the development of the policy. Indigenous knowledge is described more as something static, exemplified by wordings such as ‘traditional knowledge’, which the GCF should help to protect. Representatives of indigenous peoples on the other hand see a more active role for indigenous knowledge, but this is also constrained by epistemic differences. Western scientific perspectives are dominant and indigenous peoples have difficulty introducing a more holistic view of nature. This tension is not discussed by the GCF.

In the second part of the analysis, we examine the application of the IPP. We think the IPP is a potential tool for indigenous peoples to exert their influence but it can only work if the IPP is actually used. Our analysis of funding proposal assessments shows that the IPP is sparsely used in the GCF, which is frequently pointed out by indigenous peoples’ representatives at board meetings. Indigenous peoples argue that the IPP highlights evaluative dimensions that other frameworks and safeguards used in these proposals do not. It sounds contradictory to develop a policy that representatives of indigenous peoples prefer, but then not use it. We argue that there are few incentives for the GCF to apply the stricter IPP in assessing funding proposals, which could force accredited entities to reassess their proposals or lead to their proposals being rejected. The GCF’s dependency on accredited entities for planning and implementing climate projects creates a conflict between accredited entities, which could provide established safeguards, although not as strict as the IPP, and help the GCF to plan, implement and manage climate projects, and indigenous peoples, who could disturb project development by using the IPP. The strategy for the GCF is to portray the safeguards used by the accredited entities as equivalent to the IPP, which indigenous peoples argue they are not. The IPP is subordinated to avoid disturbing important relations of dependency.

## 6. Methods and material

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This thesis is focused on contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts in GCF governance. The process of meaning making or sense making around governance issues is to a large degree mediated through language, making qualitative methods more suitable than quantitative. The thesis is mainly based on document analyses. Documents in all forms are at the centre of almost all GCF activities. They hold together and constitute the GCF as an entity, both internally and to the outside. This is exemplified by the GCF Handbook (Green Climate Fund, 2021a), which is a compilation of important GCF documents. The handbook runs up to a sizable 761 pages in the latest version. Three of the four studies also include complementary interviews (studies 1, 2 and 4). Interviews have been used as ‘reality checks’ that confirm and support findings in the document analyses. Below I will discuss methods and material in more detail. I begin with the empirical material and then discuss how the material has been analysed.

Regarding research ethics: all documents are publicly available and hence do not contain any sensitive content. Prior to the interviews all interviewees were informed in a written document about the four ethical rules developed by the Swedish Research Council. Participants were informed about: 1) what the research is about; 2) consent; 3) confidentiality; and 4) how the research material will be used. All interviewees are anonymized in the articles.

### 6.1. Documents

Some might argue that documents are poor sources for analysing contradictions, ambiguities, and conflicts, that organization documents are controlled and well-arranged black-box representations that do not reveal anything about potential conflicts surrounding their making. This is true; often we do not know anything about the discussions preceding the publication of a document<sup>2</sup> but the absence of an explicit conflict does not exclude the existence of contradictions, ambiguities and potential conflicts in documents, especially not in a complex organization such as the GCF, which tries to respond to and incorporate a variety of different perspectives (see section 3.2.). These organizational circumstances make GCF-related

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<sup>2</sup> Sometimes GCF documents do make conflicts explicit, particularly board meeting reports where different actors may debate and show the conflicting dimensions in global climate finance governance. External GCF-related documents from civil society organizations also often articulate conflicts explicitly.

documents rich sources for identifying contradictions, ambiguities, and conflicts. Apart from GCF documents, I also use external documents from civil society organizations, private sector organizations, and other international organizations engaged with the GCF or in other ways involved in climate finance. All types of documents that can enhance the picture of the object of study are interesting, which means there is often a mixture of different types of documents in the studies, although some may occur more frequently than others. If you find consistent patterns across a variety of organization documents it is likely to be an indication of persistent and dominant views within an organization. In the following subsections I will present the different forms of documents used and what information they contain.

### 6.1.1. Green Climate Fund documents

Here I will briefly mention what kind of GCF documents are used in the thesis. For a more thorough description of the different types of GCF documents, see Appendix A. Broadly, GCF documents are categorized as *Operational Documents* or *Board Documents*, which are then further divided into different subtypes within the broader categories. The category of Operational Documents consists of 28 subtypes of documents. The GCF writes that these documents, e.g. proposals, agreements and reports, “facilitate and formalize working arrangements and ensure that activities are done properly and smoothly” (Green Climate Fund, 2020d). Sometimes the subtypes seem to overlap. The documents used from the category of Operational Documents in the thesis are *policies, guidelines, publications, and templates*.

The majority of the documents used in this thesis are from the latter category of Board documents that describe the work of the Board and other GCF units and actors supporting the work of the Board. These documents are divided into seven subtypes by the GCF: *Agendas, Board Meeting Reports, Action Items, Co-chairs Notes, Decisions, Information, and Submissions*. Most of the material used in the analyses comes from Board Meeting Reports, Action Items, Information documents, and Submissions. The three last types of documents are found in connection with agenda items, often included in annexes to GCF meeting reports. These may be technical reports from experts and working groups, policy drafts, strategic plans, annual reports, decision proposals, guideline drafts, policy drafts, and submissions from external actors, e.g., civil society organizations. In turn, these documents may contain further references to other associated documents.

The selection of GCF documents was obviously based on the relevance of the documents in relation to the object of analysis in the different studies. When the object of analysis

## Methods and material

coincided with formal governance areas in the GCF, the GCF Handbook (2021a) turned out to be a good starting point for finding relevant documents, e.g., the processes surrounding the development of the Indigenous Peoples Policy or the review of observer participation in the GCF, which are easily identifiable in the GCF Handbook. Most GCF documents are numbered using the GCF document register system which makes them relatively easy to find<sup>3</sup>. Individual GCF documents are accessed through the GCF website where you can search by register number or words. You can also apply different filter functions in your search. In some of the studies, the objects of analyses did not coincide with formal standalone governance areas in the GCF Handbook. To find relevant documents I searched for keywords related to the analysed issue in the GCF Handbook and on the GCF website, where all public GCF documents can be found using various search filters. The website also has search filters to find more specific documents.

### 6.1.2. Transitional Committee documents

The Transitional Committee was set up by the UNFCCC to design the GCF, so documents from the Transitional Committee are not technically GCF documents but are found on the UNFCCC website (UNFCCC, 2011a). During 2011, the Transitional Committee had four meetings and three workshops. Participants included country representatives from developing and developed countries, United Nations organs such as the UNDP, the World Bank and other development banks, non-governmental actors from civil society and private sector organizations. Other actors involved in the work of the Transitional Committee work included members of the Technical Support Unit who assisted the Transitional Committee Board. Members of the Technical Support unit were staff recruited from existing UN organs for the special purpose of designing the GCF. The types of documents that were used in the Transitional Committee include *Information Notes*, *Agendas*, *Meeting Summaries*, *Background Notes*, *Reports*, *Presentations*, *Scoping Papers*, *Working Papers*, *Drafts*, *Information Notes and Submissions*. For a more detailed description of the different types of documents see Appendix A.

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<sup>3</sup> The somewhat easy access to GCF documents does not mean that the GCF is always transparent. For study 1, I requested information from the GCF not found on the GCF website. This concerned the Secretariat's recommendations to the Board regarding which organizations that applied for observer status in the GCF should be accredited by the GCF. This was denied by the Secretariat. It was argued that such disclosure would affect the legitimate privacy of organization representatives applying on behalf of their organization. This information would not have been difficult to remove and this non-disclosure makes it impossible to investigate on what grounds some civil society and private sector organizations become accredited while others are denied observer status in the GCF.

The selection of Transitional Committee documents was somewhat easier than for GCF documents. TC documents are related to a particular event, the design of the GCF, which also limits the number of documents. Of course, not all Transitional Committee documents were relevant, and based on the object of analysis in study 1, the selection of documents focused on the existence of discussions about the role of stakeholders and observers in the upcoming GCF.

### 6.1.3. Other external documents

External documents in the thesis come from civil society organizations discussing the GCF, e.g. Jubilee South, and documents from other climate governance organizations such as the Climate Investment Fund. They are not connected with any formal submission process within the Transitional Committee or the GCF and are often used in the introductions and background descriptions of the studies, except in study 4 where they are also part of the analytical material. These documents are not described in any more detail.

## 6.2. Interviews

There are 10 interviews in total (one of the interviewees from the Global South was interviewed twice): one GCF Board member, representing a developed country in the GCF; three civil society organization representatives from the Global North – all accredited observers to the GCF; three civil society organization representatives from the Global South – all accredited observers to the GCF; one civil society organization representative working for developing country representatives in the GCF; and one private sector representative from the Global South, also an accredited observer to the GCF. Within their own organizations the interviewees have the roles and responsibilities of climate finance specialist and GCF specialist. Often, they are responsible for engaging directly with the GCF, e.g., as an accredited observer. The Board member interviewee is affiliated with a ministry in the home country, which is common among GCF board members.

I did expect to collect more interview material but access was a recurring problem. Attempts were made to interview members from the GCF Secretariat but with no success. There have been discussions about the Secretariat being understaffed (Bruun, 2017), which was confirmed by our interaction with the Secretariat in relation to study 2. Me and my co-author Håkan Thörn made a request to interview members of the Secretariat. The Secretariat responded that it received a high volume of queries daily and that it probably would not be able

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to respond in a timely manner. Instead, the Secretariat provided links to GCF documents it thought could be useful. We sent a reminder to the Secretariat about the interview request later but we did not receive any answer. I also made several attempts to interview board members but with very limited success. Those who were most willing to be interviewed are members from civil society organizations, which may also reflect relations of power. It is likely that those who feel that their concerns are less well represented in the GCF will have a greater incentive to voice their concerns through other channels. Nevertheless, the reply frequencies for our interview requests were also quite low for this group. One can only speculate as to why. Previous research has shown that participation in the GCF is demanding for many civil society organizations. The amount of reading they need to do to prepare for Board meetings is described as very extensive (Bruun, 2017).

Two of the interviews were carried out face to face and audio-recorded. The other interviews were accomplished using social media platforms such as FaceTime or Zoom. These interviews were both audio- and video-recorded, except one, and this was a condition put forward by the interviewee. For this interview I made notes during and right after the interview. The reason for doing interviews using social media platforms was because of large geographical distances. It did not feel justifiable to travel very long distances to conduct a few interviews. My experience of doing interviews using social media platforms is that they do not differ that much from a face-to-face interview. The interviews lasted between 40 and 60 minutes. For the interviews I used semi-structured interview guides that allowed the interviewee to expand on what the interviewee thought was interesting and also ensured that certain themes were covered. The interviews were usually transcribed verbatim, including pauses, emotional responses, and restarts.

### 6.3. Analysing data

The general analytical approach used in this thesis can be defined as *abduction*, i.e., the merging of deductive and inductive reasoning. The risk of putting too much emphasis on deductive reasoning is that the empirical data may be forced into pre-existing theoretical concepts that poorly reflect what is going on in the empirical field. This can be balanced against a more grounded approach that is more sensitive to the empirical material. Tavory and Timmermanns (2014) discuss how it is possible to ground the analysis in the empirical material while recognizing the social embeddedness of meaning making. They argue that meaning making is not only driven by our ideas but “the object [of analysis] must be understood as an active



part of the puzzle of meaning-making” (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014, p. 25). By recognizing the “affordances that the objects itself provides” (ibid, 26), analyses can become more grounded and better reflect the objects of analysis. Abduction then, as used in this thesis, was an iterative analytical process in which I constantly tried to be conscious of the resistance in the empirical data and allowed this resistance to shape my interpretations while developing theoretical abstractions, which in turn has helped me to see the data in new ways. Below I will describe a general picture of my analytical processes.

### 6.3.1. Coding and interpretation

Compared to interviews that often apply some sort of purposeful design, such as a semi-structured interview, organizational documents do not necessarily fit one’s purposes or research concerns neatly, so it is obviously necessary to find keywords that can help to identify text passages that are relevant for your purposes (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). Keywords can be general concepts, concepts from previous research but also concepts more specific to the organizational context. In study 1, the purpose was to examine stakeholder participation in the GCF and words such as ‘stakeholder’, ‘participation’ were obvious choices, but ‘observers’ and ‘active observers’ also became important keywords, as these are particular concepts used by the GCF to describe formal stakeholder roles in the GCF. The more I familiarized myself with the material in each study the more useful keywords I was able find. Due to the sometimes extensive material I often used the auto-coding function in Atlas.ti, which is the Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), used in all the studies. The auto-coding function simply traces all occurrences of selected keywords in the material, which obviously speeds up the process of finding relevant text passages. Apart from the keyword search described above, the interviews were analysed in the same way as the documents described below.

After having identified relevant text passages, the early coding was often based on a more inductive approach. I basically used ‘in vivo’ coding, using the words and concepts occurring in the text and related to discussions around my keywords. The keyword of transformational change in study 2, for example, was connected with discussions about ‘new financial instruments’, ‘innovative’, ‘private sector’, ‘project proposals’, ‘good quality’, ‘guidelines’ and ‘country ownership’. Right from the beginning I used memos to collect my ideas appearing during the coding process. At this early stage I did not categorize them as particular types of memos and they had no other function than to collect whatever ideas appeared in my head

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when reading the texts. Many of them withered as the analysis developed but some could be further developed as new understandings emerged through the analyses.

As the coding process evolved, 'in vivo' coding was replaced by more descriptive coding. GCF documents have several layers of actors I had to be aware of. Questions such as who wrote the text, which actors figure in the text, who says or does what, who is implied but not explicitly mentioned, what roles are attributed and by whom, were used to code and make sense of relevant interactions and relations. Scale is another example of a common descriptive code I used, this because the GCF is situated in a rather complex cross-scale structure.

In the later stages of analysis, I focused more on finding patterns in the material, how the codes related to each other, and on identifying any more interpretive and theoretical codes that could be applied to make sense of these patterns. During this stage memos were also further elaborated. They often contained longer discussions as I was trying to grasp the material at a more abstract level. This is also where the abductive approach was most obvious as I moved between ideas from previous research, existing theoretical perspectives, and the empirical material. In some of the studies, for example in study 2, the theoretical concept of empty signifier seemed to work well right from the beginning and did not change during the analytical process. At other times the initial theoretical concepts were partly replaced. In study 4, we elaborated on a few different theoretical ideas before deciding what captured the material in the best way, which was also a response to expansion of the empirical material. This was an example of how the empirical material resisted and guided the analysis further.

## 7. The studies

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### Study I

**Bertilsson, J. (Manuscript). Organizing Stakeholder Involvement in Global Climate Governance: The Effects of Resource Dependencies and Institutional Logics in the Green Climate Fund (revised and re-submitted to *Environmental Values*).**

Stakeholder participation has been strongly advocated in environmental governance, especially on a global scale where it has been seen as a remedy to the ‘democratic deficit’ in global climate governance. The GCF claims that active engagement of a diverse set of stakeholders is central to the GCF. The study applies a critical perspective on stakeholder participation and investigates what stakeholder roles are enabled or restricted in the GCF, and the mechanisms shaping this organization. The study is based on a document analysis with support from interviews with stakeholder representatives in the Green Climate Fund (GCF).

Previous research on stakeholder participation in climate governance has often focused on either ideational dimensions or resource aspects that affect stakeholder participation. This study suggests that our understanding of stakeholder organization can benefit from an exploration of the interconnectedness between ideational and resource dimensions.

The study shows how resource dependencies and the institutional logics connected with the realization of resources determine which stakeholder roles become privileged or subordinated. The reliance of the GCF on the inflow of money and limited pledges from developed countries has led to an emphasis on private sector investment. It is argued in the study that the arrangement of stakeholder constituencies in the GCF was affected by the presence of this market logic. The nine-constituency model established by the UNFCCC was reduced to only two in the GCF, with the private sector constituency unchanged. Many CSOs criticized the privileged role of private sector stakeholders and interpreted the two-constituency model as an attempt to single out the private sector because they can help to develop private sector investments for GCF climate projects. Collecting all other stakeholders and their diverse interests into a single civil society group limits their ability to express their particular views and they can only make general statements. This is interpreted in the study as a way to control politically oriented stakeholders. Fewer conflicts mean that the GCF can satisfy the private sector’s preference for a depoliticized management of the fund.

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The GCF is also dependent on large, resourceful and technically oriented partners in the planning, implementing, and monitoring of climate projects. This partnership logic is reflected in GCF's criteria for becoming an accredited stakeholder in the GCF. In the application, organizations have to declare their specialized scientific and technical competences, together with descriptions of their well-organized administrative structure. Smaller, less resourceful and politically oriented stakeholders have difficulties meeting these criteria, despite being already poorly represented in the GCF, according to civil society critique. Broad representativity is then subordinated by this partnership logic. Politically oriented stakeholders that critically examine GCF's partners are controlled at board meetings to prevent them from challenging the collaboration with important partners.

The claim that the GCF seeks the active engagement of diverse stakeholders can be questioned. The GCF is mainly interested in stakeholders that can bring certain resources to the fund, in other words private sector stakeholders and large, resourceful and technically oriented stakeholders. Smaller, less resourceful and mainly politically oriented stakeholders, especially from the Global South, face restrictions.

## Study II

**Bertilsson, J., & Thörn, H. (2021). Discourses on transformational change and paradigm shift in the Green Climate Fund: the divide over financialization and country ownership. *Environmental Politics*, 30 (3), 423-441.**

This study analyses how the governing principles of transformational change and paradigm shift are used in the GCF. The concept of transformational change in particular has become institutionalized in both scientific and policy communities discussing environmental governance, especially climate change governance. However, there is little consensus on what the concept actually means. Also, critical research on the underlying premises and assumptions about transformational change and how it is applied in governance has been limited. The analysis uses GCF documents and interviews as empirical material.

We argue that the GCF charges transformational change with a meaning that enables a top-down financialization of recipient countries, while still describing it as country ownership. To assist in understanding these seemingly contradictory discursive practices we apply the analytical concept of empty signifier.

Some board members and the Private Sector Advisory Group (a sub-unit within the Green Climate Fund) argue that public funding will be limited, which makes it crucial to incentivize investments from the private sector. The Green Climate fund needs to go beyond grants and concessional loans and offer a wider palette of financial products, e.g., green bonds and insurance products. The problem is that many project proposals lack an engagement with the private sector and hence recipient countries need further guidance. This guidance should provide clarity on the expectations of co-financing (e.g., the private sector). In argumentations for better guidance, private sector inclusion is equated with transformational change and paradigm shift. Some civil society representatives and board members challenge the argument that financialization of the Green Climate Fund is inevitable and a primary goal. They argue that financial instruments should be judged on their effectiveness at meeting the needs of recipient countries, as articulated by the countries themselves, not the ability to mobilize funds from the private sector.

The GCF is caught between different commitments. The Green Climate Fund embraces the principle of country ownership and recognizing the needs articulated by recipient countries, but at the same time there are many actors in the Green Climate Fund pushing for financialization of the Green Climate Fund, despite limited interest from recipient countries. The Green Climate Fund tries to overcome this conflict by equating the needs of recipient countries with financialization of global climate governance. The Green Climate Fund argues that as the needs in recipient countries evolve as a consequence of climate change the Green Climate Fund will need to respond flexibly, e.g., with increasingly innovative financing mechanisms. Financialization of the Green Climate Fund is thus not a challenge to the needs in recipient countries, rather a flexible response to their needs. This can be seen as an attempt to conceal the conflicts around the financialization of climate finance governance and country ownership.

### Study III

**Bertilsson, J. (Manuscript). Managing vulnerability in the Green Climate Fund (submitted to *Climate and Development*)**

Over the years, the meaning of vulnerability has expanded in governance, from a hazard-impact perspective that emphasizes the biophysical aspects of vulnerability, to include more social dimensions of vulnerability, e.g. the effects of poverty on people's adaptive capacity.

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In recent discussions, vulnerability has been connected with discussions in social science and policy about the need for more profound social changes in order to adapt, often discussed as *transformative adaptation*. The discussion is mainly normative and few studies apply a critical perspective on transformational change in relation to vulnerability, which this study aims to do. This study explores how the meaning of vulnerability is shaped in the GCF and how the concept of transformational change is implicated in this. The empirical material consists of GCF documents.

The analysis uses Jasanoff's co-production approach and shows how dominant logics such as science, market logics, and other economic logics are used to measure and finance the management of vulnerability. The scientific approach reduces vulnerability to those aspects that preferably can be quantified. This makes for an easily demarcated regulatory object that can be governed in a predictable way but it also reduces those aspects of vulnerability that will not be easily quantifiable, such as the normative, ethical and political aspects of vulnerability.

The GCF works hard to make adaption actions compatible with market logics and tries to support the development of 'innovative financing' in adaptation. Developing countries also need to be educated on how to make a business case for adaptation; they need to learn to speak the language of the private sector and make themselves bankable according to the GCF. This obviously reduces vulnerability to those aspects that can be made profitable for the private sector. The insurance business is described as a natural partner for the GCF that can provide high-impact interventions. The insurance business is based on risk management and also requires quantifiable data, which also reduces the aspects of vulnerability that are made visible.

The GCF discourse on transformational change does not have the radical connotations sometimes found in research. Transformational change in the GCF is closely connected with private sector inclusion and the expansion of new financial products for adaptation. It is assumed that an expansion of private sector funding is essential in order to achieve transformational adaptation that addresses urgent vulnerabilities. The private sector is described as having a transformational role by helping societies adapt to a rapidly changing environment, and is often seen as the only actor with the flexibility needed to meet these challenges. Funding proposals are required to discuss their transformational impact, and if transformational change is equated with private sector involvement, then aspects of vulnerability that may be articulated are, again, only those that can be profitable for the private sector.

## Study IV

**Bertilsson, J., & L. Soneryd (Manuscript). Indigenous peoples in the Green Climate Fund (submitted to *Environmental Sociology*).**

The study investigates the role of indigenous peoples in the GCF. The GCF emphasizes the importance of indigenous knowledge and at the same time the GCF stresses the scalability of projects, how they can become standardized models that are transferable to other contexts. This contradiction between generalizability and the particular and local is a potential conflict and we want to know how and to what degree indigenous knowledge and perspectives are included and recognized in the GCF, and if they matter in practice. We analyse this by investigating the development of the GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy and how this policy is used in GCF discussions about funding proposals that include indigenous peoples. The empirical material consists of both documents and interviews with civil society organizations representing indigenous peoples in the GCF. Documents include material such as policies, reports from the GCF, funding proposals to the GCF, and civil society organization opinion papers and reports.

One analytical concept used in the study is epistemic belonging, which emphasizes the mutual recognition of expert communities, and the circumstances that exist and may be created to support the use of their special knowledge. We also connect this to ideas about organizational dependency, which influences the type of partner organizations that are valued most highly, and which may affect the degree of inclusion and epistemic belonging for indigenous peoples in the GCF

There are somewhat contradictory accounts of the process of developing the IPP. Some believe the process was inclusive while others thought the GCF Secretariat mainly organized the process. However, some are quite satisfied with the outcome. The policy emphasizes the positive contribution of indigenous knowledge in mitigation and adaptation actions. The real test though, as some of the interviewees argued, is how the policy is implemented.

When it comes to discussions on knowledge forms, there are some tensions. The policy uses the term ‘traditional knowledge’ but an interviewee prefers indigenous knowledge. ‘Traditional’ might imply that indigenous knowledge is static and not flexible enough to contribute to new forms of knowledge. The policy often talks about protecting traditional knowledge, which also underlines the static dimension. Indigenous peoples also express how

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they struggle to make their holistic view more relevant for climate organizations, which is dominated by western science perspectives.

The policy is sparsely used in funding proposal assessments. This is repeatedly commented on by indigenous peoples who argue that the policy protects the interests of indigenous peoples better than other safeguards used to assess the protection and inclusion of indigenous peoples in climate projects. It seems contradictory that the GCF does not prioritize the use of its own policy. The GCF instead attempts to portray the policies used by the accredited entities as equivalent to the IPP. We explain this by the GCFs dependency on accredited entities. There are no incentives for the GCF to apply their own and supposedly stricter policy to assess the funding proposals designed by the same accredited entities that help the GCF to plan, implement and manage climate projects. This means that the GCF policy becomes subordinated, and representatives of indigenous peoples in the GCF are thus prevented from pushing for better policies that could protect the interests of indigenous peoples.



## 8. Conclusion

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So, what patterns in global climate governance are reproduced or challenged in the GCF, or are there any new trajectories? One clear pattern that the GCF reproduces or even enhances is the influence of market logics and the private sector in the organization of the GCF. This permeates many areas of the GCF. In study 1, I argue that market logics affected the design of stakeholder constituencies. A contradiction arises when the GCF emphasizes the active engagement of diverse stakeholders while at the same time designing a participation arrangement that clearly privileges private sector stakeholders. Stakeholders who are committed to highlighting the political dimensions of climate finance become subordinated to stakeholders that can bring in money from the private sector and/or help the GCF to plan and implement projects. The GCF has not made any comments on the design of the participation arrangement and thus simply ignores the logical inconsistency between stated commitments and the procedural arrangements. In study 2 we show how the GCF enhances the financialization of climate finance through the governing principle of transformational change, which is equated to the use of new and supposedly innovative financial instruments in the design of climate projects. An emphasis on new financial instruments means that countries in the Global South must make themselves bankable if they wish to receive climate funding, which contradicts the principle of country ownership, i.e., that project design should be based on the needs experienced by countries in the Global South. The GCF tries to overcome this conflict by describing a financialization of climate finance as a flexible response to the needs of developing countries, although there is no evidence that countries in the Global South have asked for these financial instruments. On the contrary, many actors in the Global South are sceptical of using market solutions to finance climate actions. The market logic also affects what aspects of vulnerability become eligible for support. In study 3, I argue that the use of market logics in addressing those particularly vulnerable to climate change limits the dimensions of vulnerability that are recognized, which may actually contradict the GCF commitment to support those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. The contradiction surrounding the use of insurances is one example. Worsening climate effects might lead to such high insurance premiums that vulnerable people could not afford them and they are no longer profitable for the insurance business. Although this risk is recognized by the GCF, it is by and large ignored and the promotion of new and innovative insurance

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products is still described as a good adaptation strategy and invaluable for building knowledge on climate resilience and risk management.

Another distinct pattern that is reproduced is the dominance of scientific and technical approaches to climate finance governance. Using ‘facts’ in governance makes it easier to create measurable and controllable regulatory objects. However, this reduces other important dimensions, such as moral, ethical, and political aspects that are difficult to translate into measurable and controllable units. In study 1, I show how the technical perspective on governance in the GCF affects which stakeholders are privileged in the GCF. In the application form for becoming an accredited observer in the GCF, CSOs must specify their specialized scientific and technical competences. Politically oriented stakeholders become subordinated in this accreditation process, and this contradicts the GCF claim of supporting an active engagement of a *diverse set* of stakeholders. Scientific practices and their reductive tendency are also present in GCF’s management of vulnerability discussed in study 3. Those aspects of vulnerability that can be measured and quantified are clearly favoured and reduce other dimensions of vulnerability. The western scientific perspective is also present in relation to other forms of knowledge contributions, e.g., indigenous knowledge as discussed in study 4. Although indigenous peoples are included and their particular perspectives celebrated, they have difficulty getting across their more holistic views on nature.

Does the GCF challenge any structures or develop any new directions? Inclusion in its many forms is a recurring theme in previous research, and demands for more inclusive and responsive governance are also reflected in the GCF. The GCF likes to portray itself as an inclusive organization that is responsive to the needs and interests of a variety of actors, exemplified by the stated ambitions and aims in section 3.2. This may appear as a challenge to previous forms of top-down governance. However, inclusive governance also poses a potential problem as different needs and interests are not necessarily compatible with each other. Demands for more and better inclusion will most likely lead to more contradictions and conflicts, while at the same time climate organizations want to be perceived as logically coherent (Stokke, 2020) and efficient organizations that can achieve what their mandate expects of them. Contradictions will of course always exist but the major problem, I argue, is that they are not discussed as contradictions. Instead, organizations such as the GCF portray inclusive governance as just ‘more and better’, without recognizing the tacit superordination and subordination of interests, and the power relations and dominant perspectives that affect these prioritizations. This is similar to Blühdorn and Deflorian’s (2019) ideas about ‘symbolic

politics’ or ‘simulative politics’.<sup>4</sup> Translated into the context of the GCF: the GCF practices analysed in the studies of this thesis can be described as ‘simulative governance’, a pretence of inclusive governance that claims to be responsive to all needs without any major conflicts, but at the same time subordinates those elements that are not compatible with dominant logics.

Does the GCF fail in every way? No, it does not, but given the crucial position that the GCF has in the governance of global climate finance, it is important to critically analyse the GCF’s mandate, which is to support the Global South with the resources needed to manage climate change effects, based on the needs of the Global South. Many stakeholders, especially CSOs from both the Global North and the Global South, had high hopes that the GCF would be a different organization, one that would be responsive to the needs of the Global South (Bruun, 2017). The studies in this thesis show that established dominant structures and power relations make this difficult. The patterns of ‘old’ top-down development politics may not be as explicit as before but they are still present under portrayals of inclusive governance.

The fact that this thesis is not policy oriented does not mean it is not constructive, it all depends on your time perspective. There is an analogy between critical research and the way some social movements work. Critical research and social movement critique of society is about social change in the longer perspective, it is about raising questions that do not have an immediate answer, it is about providing critique without having to deliver practical solutions, which inevitably would need to connect with established dominant structures that would restrict what can be said.

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<sup>4</sup> I think the concepts capture important aspects of governance but I believe that Blühdorn and Deflorian (2019) conflate the practices of liberal democracies and their embeddedness in a capitalistic system with democratic principles. They argue that “the prevailing and sacrosanct notions of freedom, self-determination, and self-realization are firmly based on the principle of unsustainability” (p. 34). China is an example of how a capitalistic style and market-based system contribute to unsustainability without being connected with principles such as freedom, self-determination or self-realization. If so, freedom, self-determination and self-realization in China would be limited to being a consumer within a capitalistic style system, which is not (yet) the case in liberal democracies. I think there is a danger in conflating these principles with the unsustainable *practices* of liberal democracies. This could feed arguments for authoritarianism. I believe that unsustainability is better explained by the effects of capitalism and how these principles are utilized in the service of capitalism.

## Sammanfattning på svenska [Summary in Swedish]

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Klimatförändringarna är en av vår tids viktigaste frågor och kanske också den mest komplicerade eftersom den utmanar många djupt rotade sociala strukturer, som inte är förenliga med ett hållbart förhållningssätt till jorden vi lever på. Hanteringen av klimatförändringarna, både att minska utsläppen och att anpassa sig till klimateffekterna, kommer också kräva stora resurser. Detta gör att finansieringen av klimatåtgärder och distributionen av dessa resurser ofta ger upphov till konflikter i den globala klimatstyrningen, vilket inte minst visar sig vid de årliga klimatmötena, de så kallade COP-mötena som sker genom Förenta Nationernas ramverk för klimatförändringar, UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). Konflikterna gäller frågor om vilka som är mest ansvariga för klimatförändringarna, vilka som ska bidra med mest resurser, vilka som behöver resurserna mest, vilka insatser man ska satsa resurserna på, ska resurserna komma från allmänna medel eller ska marknaden och den privata sektorn lösa det så kallade finansieringsgapet? Ofta utspelar sig dessa konflikter mellan länderna i det globala Nord och det globala Syd. Det globala Nord menar att alla har ett ansvar för att minska utsläppen, även de så kallade utvecklingsländerna, vilket gör att det globala Nord oftare betonar utsläppsminskningar mer än anpassningsåtgärder. Det globala Nord menar också att allmänna medel inte kommer räcka för att täcka behoven av klimatåtgärder, vilket gör den privata sektorn central i mobiliseringen av finansiella medel. Det globala Syd hävdar att det är de så kallade utvecklade länderna som har orsakat klimatförändringarna och att de därför är skyldiga att minska sina utsläpp mest, samt bistå med ett pålitligt och kontinuerligt överförande av resurser till det globala Syd, framförallt till anpassningsåtgärder. Det globala Syd är generellt skeptiska till marknadslösningar för att finansiera klimatåtgärder, inte minst på grund av svårigheterna att göra anpassningsåtgärder vinstgivande för den privata sektorn. De kräver också att globala Syd själva ska få bestämma hur de ska använda resurserna, utifrån sina egna upplevda behov.

Svårigheten att komma överens kring dessa frågor gör att många problem skjuts på framtiden och indirekt delegeras till organisationer inom den globala klimatstyrningen som ska omsätta den globala klimatpolitiken till praktiska åtgärder, såsom klimatfonder som är i fokus i den här avhandlingen. Avhandlingens empiriska studieobjekt är Green Climate Fund (GCF) som är den största klimatfonden och en av de viktigaste finansiella enheterna inom UNFCCC.

Det är klimatfonderna som ska mobilisera de resurser som krävs till olika klimatåtgärder och fördela dessa resurser till de länder som behöver dem bäst och som har de mest effektiva förslagen på klimatåtgärder.

GCF ärver således många av spänningarna från den globala klimatpolitiken samtidigt som fonden förväntas operationalisera effektiva klimatåtgärder. Svårigheten är att operationaliseringen av klimatåtgärder ofta blir inriktad på tekniska frågor, samtidigt som de innehåller många politiska dimensioner, vilket gör att det sällan finns en självklar ”objektiv” lösning. Detta skapar motsägelser, mångtydigheter och konflikter kring operationaliseringen av klimatåtgärder. Dessa spänningar ökar också med krav på att klimatstyrningen ska vara mer inkluderande och ta in perspektiv och erfarenheter från flera aktörer i utformandet och genomförandet av klimatåtgärder. Kraven på inklusion kommer från aktörer från det globala Syd som har negativa erfarenheter från toppstyrda åtgärder inom utvecklingspolitiken där stora globala organisationer, som t.ex. Världsbanken, dikterade de åtgärder som skulle genomföras i de så kallade utvecklingsländerna, och sällan utifrån de behov som länderna i det globala Syd själva artikulade.

De fyra delstudierna i avhandlingen fokuserar på olika styrningsområden i GCF men det gemensamma för studierna är att de på olika sätt granskar hur GCF hanterar de olika krav som ställs på organisationen från olika intressen, och de motsägelser och konflikter som uppstår som ett resultat av det. Avhandlingens övergripande frågor är: 1) Vilka huvudsakliga motsägelser, mångtydigheter och konflikter kan identifieras i GCF? 2) Hur hanteras dessa motsägelser, mångtydigheter och konflikter av GCF? 3) Hur formar hanteringen av motsägelser, mångtydigheter och konflikter representationen av frågor och aktörer i GCF, vilka aspekter blir framträdande och vilka underordnas?

Avhandlingen bygger på kvalitativa analyser av dokument, framförallt från GCF men även andra aktörers dokument, samt intervjuer med aktörer som på olika sätt är involverade i GCF, såsom representanter från civilsamhälleorganisationer och den privata sektorn vilka är ackrediterade av GCF att delta som observatörer i GCF. I de fyra studierna används olika teoretiska verktyg för att fånga det partikulära i studierna men det gemensamma för de analytiska verktygen är att de kan användas för att dekonstruera och kritiska ifrågasätta GCF:s framställningar av en enhetlig och inkluderande klimatstyrning, som gör dess motsägelser, mångtydigheter och konflikter osynliga. I avhandlingens kapp appliceras immanent kritik som ett övergripande analytiskt ramverk för att diskutera studiernas gemensamma aspekter kring enhetliga representationer och underliggande motsägelser och konflikter i GCF.

### Studie I

I den här studien analyseras hur GCF organiserar deltagandet av intressenter (stakeholders) i GCF:s deltagararrangemang på den organisatoriska globala nivån. Studien bygger på analyser av dokument från GCF och olika civilsamhälleorganisationer, samt intervjuer med representanter för civilsamhälleorganisationer och den privata sektorn.

GCF hävdar att ett aktivt deltagande av olika typer av intressenter är en del av GCF:s ”DNA”. Analysen visar dock att man kan ifrågasätta detta påstående. En till synes inkluderande diskurs kring deltagande krockar med praktiker som privilegierar vissa intressenter över andra. Intressenter som får störst inflytande är representanter för den privata sektorn, samt tekniskt orienterade civilsamhälleorganisationer med stor organisatorisk kapacitet. Intressenter som underordnas och ges mindre inflytelserika roller är små civilsamhälleorganisationer, som i första hand är politiskt orienterade och som i huvudsak bidrar med sina erfarenheter från det globala Syd. Detta visas i omvandlingen av representationsgrupper i GCF där UNFCCC:s etablerade modell med nio grupper frångicks och ersattes av endast två grupper där den privata sektorn är den enda grupp som får behålla sin egen specifika representation. Detta påverkar andra gruppers förmåga att artikulera sina åsikter i GCF. Det visas också genom att GCF, redan i ansökningsformuläret för att bli ackrediterad som organisation i GCF, privilegierar stora tekniskt orienterade organisationer som är viktiga för att hjälpa GCF med att planera och implementera klimatprojekt. Det visas till sist genom att GCF försöker kontrollera organisationer som kritiskt granskar GCF:s ackreditering av utvecklingsbanker med en historia av att bryta mot mänskliga rättigheter i sina projekt.

Resultaten av studien förklaras genom en kombination av analytiska perspektiv från teorier om resursberoende och institutionell logik. Organisationer som GCF är beroende av både materiella och immateriella resurser såsom pengar och demokratisk legitimitet. Många av dessa resurser kan inte produceras av GCF själva utan kräver deltagande av olika partners. Samtidigt bygger realisering av olika resurser på olika institutionella logiker som föreskriver hur aktörer ska agera för att uppnå resultat, och dessa logiker är inte nödvändigtvis kompatibla med varandra. GCF eftersträvar både ökade investeringar från den privata sektorn och ett mer inkluderande deltagande. Ett utökat deltagande kan dock skapa mer politiska konflikter kring finansieringen av klimatprojekt i GCF och minska intresset hos den privata sektorn. Investeringar från den privata sektorn värderas högre och ett mer inkluderat deltagande

underordnas och kontrolleras för att inte störa relationen till den privata sektorn. Denna prioritering är inte explicit och detta för att inte störa bilden av en inkluderande organisation.

### Studie II

Begrepp som beskriver behovet av omfattande samhällsomvandling för att hantera klimatkriser blir allt vanligare i både samhällsvetenskaplig forskning och i policyutveckling. Begreppen *transformativ förändring* (transformational change) och *paradigmskifte* (paradigm shift) är centrala styrningsprinciper i GCF. Studien söker med hjälp av GCF-dokument och intervjuer analysera hur GCF använder dessa begrepp. Trots sin centrala roll i GCF är begreppen inte formellt definierade vilket gör dem mångtydiga i många diskussioner. Ett argument i denna artikel är att begreppens mångtydighet är en viktig del av deras funktion. Teoretiskt förstås begreppen som *empty signifiers* (tomma betecknare). I GCF möjliggör det glidningar av begreppen mot betydelser som är kompatibla med specifika intressen i GCF. Mångtydigheten innebär dock att det uppstår konflikter kring begreppens användning utifrån olika intressen, en konflikt som GCF på olika sätt försöker överbrygga och göra osynlig.

Begreppen blir synliga i diskussioner kring projektansökningar till GCF som vissa styrelsemedlemmar anser vara av otillräcklig kvalitet, att projekten inte uppfyller kraven på att vara "transformational" (transformerande). Vad som menas initialt är dock inte helt klart men begreppet används ändå som ett skäl för implicera behovet av en toppstyrning där GCF:s sekretariat ska ta ansvar för definitionen av begreppet samt ge vägledning om vad som är transformativt till de som skriver projektansökningar. Detta möter motstånd och kritiken handlar om att GCF inte är lyhörda mot de behov som artikuleras av lokala intressenter och vilka kan stärka länders egenansvar (country ownership), det vill säga deras rätt att själva äga frågor. GCF försöker värja sig mot kritiken och hävdar att man inte utmanar ägandet av frågan utan tillåter tillräcklig flexibilitet kring specifika behov. Senare blir det tydligare att transformativ förändring ofta kopplas till användandet av nya finansiella instrument som ska locka den privata sektorn att investera i klimatåtgärder. Detta handlar om att gå bortom en mer traditionell finansiering byggd på allmänna medel. Detta möter också motstånd och vissa påpekar att GCF inte är en bank som ska maximera vinster till den privata sektorn utan att dess roll är att tillfredsställa de behov finns i utvecklingsländerna.

GCF står mellan olika intressen. Dels vill man stå fast vid sitt engagemang för länders egenansvar samtidigt som många förespråkar en finansialisering av GCF och ett större fokus på marknadslösningar för att mobilisera resurser till klimatprojekt. GCF försöker överbrygga

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den konflikten genom att beskriva utvecklandet av nya finansiella instrument i GCF som en flexibel respons mot de behov som växer fram i utvecklingsländerna, trots att det inte finns några bevis för att dessa instrument efterfrågas av utvecklingsländerna.

### Studie III

Förståelsen och hanteringen av sårbarhet (vulnerability) mot climateffekter är en central del av globala klimatorganisationers arbete. Förståelsen av sårbarhet har förändrats över tid, från att ha fokuserat på den direkta påverkan av climateffekter, ett så kallat *risk-effektperspektiv* (hazard-impact perspective), till att inkludera mer sociala dimensioner såsom människors inbäddning i sociala strukturer och hur det påverkar deras anpassningsförmåga. En senare diskussion handlar också om behovet av mer djupgående sociala förändringar för att kunna anpassa sig till klimatförändringarna, vilket ibland beskrivs som transformativ anpassning (transformational adaptation). Som betonas även i studie II, så har begrepp som formulerats i anslutning till transformativa processer och klimatförändringarna fått en ökad betydelse både inom forskning och policyutveckling. Mycket av tidigare forskning kring transformativ anpassning är normativ, dvs. den fokuserar på hur man på bästa sätt kan möjliggöra transformativa anpassningar. Få tillämpar ett kritiskt perspektiv på begreppet. Den här studien analyserar hur begreppet används i en policymiljö såsom GCF, som har ett uppdrag att stödja de som är särskilt sårbara för climateffekter.

Studien bygger på analyser av olika typer av GCF-dokument. Teoretiskt används ansatser från vetenskapsstudier (STS, science and technology studies) och studier av styrning (governmentality) för att se hur sårbarhet görs till ett avgränsat och hanterbart regleringsobjekt. Först identifierar analysen vilka avgränsningar som görs och som har ett stort inflytande på vilka aspekter av sårbarhet som betonas i GCF. Det vetenskapliga perspektivet som syftar till att göra sårbarhet mätbart, reducerar synen på sårbarhet till de aspekter av sårbarhet som lätt kan kvantifieras. Normativa, etiska och politiska dimensioner kring sårbarhet blir därmed mindre synliga. Även GCF:s val av metodologier kring kostnadsberäkning för att få finansiellt stöd utesluter effekter av existerande sociala strukturer, t.ex. fattigdom och dess påverkan på anpassningsförmåga. En annan dominerande styrningslogik är baserad på ett ekonomiskt tänkande och mer specifikt en marknadslogik. GCF söker skapa marknader för anpassningsprojekt där den privata sektorn kan investera och göra vinster. GCF söker också få länder i det globala Syd att förstå vikten av att ha med nya finansiella lösningar i sina projektansökningar som ska locka den privata sektorn att investera. Detta innebär ett fokus på sårbarheter



som är marknadskompatibla och att andra sårbarheter som är svåra att omsätta i vinstgivande projekt blir underordnade.

I den andra delen av analysen undersöks hur begreppet transformativ förändring (se också studie II), som är en viktig styrningsprincip i GCF, kopplas till kvantifierbarheten och marknadslogiken och vilka implikationer det har för vilka aspekter av sårbarhet som betonas i GCF. Transformativ förändring kopplas starkt till GCF:s betoning av marknadslogik i utvecklandet av nya anpassningsprojekt. GCF menar att den privata sektorn har en transformativ roll i anpassningarna till klimateffekter och GCF skriver att ökningen av andelen projekt med inriktning mot den privata sektorn kommer möjliggöra transformativa anpassningar som adresserar brådskande sårbarheter. Denna diskursiva koppling mellan transformativ förändring och den privata sektorn konsoliderar marknadslogiken i GCF, vilket också reducerar möjligheterna för det globala Syd att artikulera sårbarheter som inte är kompatibla med en marknadslogik.

### Studie IV

Studien undersöker hur representanter för ursprungsbefolkningar inkluderas i GCF:s arbete. GCF betonar betydelsen av de specifika perspektiv som ursprungsbefolkningar kan bidra med i utvecklingen av klimatprojekt. Samtidigt betonas ofta generaliserbar kunskapsproduktion i GCF som kan stå i motsats till det lokala och partikulära. Vi undersöker detta närmare i GCF:s utvecklande av sin egen Indigenous Peoples Policy och på vilket sätt den kan vara en resurs för ursprungsbefolkningar i att skydda sina intressen och utöka sitt inflytande i global klimatstyrning. Studien använder dokument från GCF och organisationer för ursprungsbefolkningar som är involverade i GCF, samt intervjuer av representanter för dessa organisationer. För att förstå på vilket sätt och i vilken grad som representanter från ursprungsbefolkningar inkluderas i GCF används begreppet epistemisk tillhörighet (epistemic belonging), vilket betonar ett ömsesidigt erkännande av olika kunskapsperspektiv. Detta kopplas också till idéer om organisatoriskt beroende (organizational dependency) som beskriver hur organisationer är beroende av olika partners men också hur de prioriterar vissa partners, vilket kan ha inverkan på hur ursprungsbefolkningar inkluderas i GCF.

Analysen visar att processer kring utvecklandet av policyn var begränsad vad gäller inkluderingen av perspektiv från ursprungsbefolkningar. Policyn uttrycker synsätt på ursprungsbefolkningar som antyder att de ses som bärare av oföränderlig ”traditionell kunskap”, vilket kan begränsa möjligheterna för olika kunskapsperspektiv att kunna mötas och

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utvecklas i relation till varandra. Trots dessa begränsningar var representanter för ursprungsbefolkningar relativt nöjda med policyn.

Analysen undersöker också i vilken grad policyn används i utvärderingar av projektansökningar till GCF som involverar ursprungsbefolkningar. Representanter för ursprungsbefolkningar i GCF uttrycker frustration över att policyn inte används av de organisationer som utformar projektansökningarna och inte heller av GCF själva när de utvärderar dessa projekt. Istället används andra policys som av GCF beskrivs som likvärdiga den egna policyn, vilket representanterna för ursprungsbefolkningarna inte håller med om. Vi ser detta som ett uttryck för GCF:s beroende av de organisationer som utvecklar klimatprojekten, och som också implementerar och hanterar projekten i praktiken. GCF vill inte kräva att den egna, i delvis striktare policyn, måste tillämpas, vilket kan leda till att projekten behöver omprövas eller inte ens godkänns.

### Slutsatser

Motsägelser, mångtydigheter och konflikter är oundvikliga i komplexa organisationer som hanterar komplexa frågor, men problemet i GCF är att denna komplexitet sällan görs synlig som just motsägelser, mångtydigheter eller konflikter. Detta innebär att maktrelationer, i form av dominanta perspektiv och ojämlika beroenderelationer, mer eller mindre i tysthet över- och underordnar frågor, perspektiv och aktörer. Genom en immanent kritik av GCF har dessa motsägelser gjorts mer synliga. De blir synliga när GCF talar om ett aktivt deltagande av olika intressenter samtidigt som man privilegierar intressenter från den privata sektorn och stora, resursstarka och tekniskt orienterade intressenter. Dessa kommer sällan från fattiga länder vars behov GCF har i uppgift att stödja. De blir också synliga när GCF betonar länders egenansvar och samtidigt utformar en toppstyrd finansialisering av GCF som få i det globala Syd har efterfrågat. Motsägelserna blir vidare synliga i åtgärder som ska stödja dem som är särskilt sårbara i förhållande till klimatförändringar, men där åtgärderna samtidigt avgränsar aspekter av sårbarhet till de som går mäta med vetenskapliga kvantitativa metoder, de som går att begränsa till endast climateffekter och de som går göras vinstgivande för den privata sektorn. Motsägelserna blir också synliga när GCF omfamnar ursprungsbefolkningars bidrag till hanteringen av klimatåtgärder men sedan inte beaktar den input som de ger till GCF i utvärderingen av projektansökningar.

Hanteringen av motsägelser sker på olika sätt. Ibland ignorerar GCF dem. Begränsningen av representationsgrupper i studie I har aldrig kommenterats av GCF trots att det väcker

frågor kring möjligheterna för en rad olika intressenters aktiva deltagande. Detsamma gäller de begränsningar som finns med att använda försäkringar för att hantera sårbarhet mot klimatförändringar.. Även om begränsningen av försäkringar erkänns så fortsätter GCF att betona vikten av försäkringar som ett sätt att hantera sårbarhet. Ibland söker GCF överbrygga motstridiga berättelser – till exempel genom att hävda att finansialisering är en flexibel respons mot de behov som växer fram i det globala Syd, trots att få länder i denna del av världen har efterfrågat användandet av nya finansiella instrument för den privata sektorn, vilket visas i studie II. Som jag visat i avhandlingen sker försök till överbryggnings genom att GCF framställer andra organisationers policys för ursprungsbefolkningar som lika bra som dess egen policy, trots att representanter för ursprungsbefolkningar hävdar att GCF:s egen policy, som de också varit med att utveckla, svarar bättre mot deras behov.

Perspektiv, aktörer och frågor som framhävs i implicita prioriteringar är ofta de som kan hjälpa till att göra saker regleringsbara och relativt lätthanterliga. Vetenskapliga och tekniska perspektiv på klimatfrågan och marknadslogik är exempel på dominerande mönster i den globala klimatstyrningen som GCF reproducerar eller till och med förstärker, framförallt marknadslogiken. I motsats till dessa står perspektiv, aktörer och frågor som försöker lyfta fram de normativa, etiska och politiska aspekterna av klimatfinansieringen, vilka är svåra att kvantifiera, reglera och inordna i kalkulativa logiker. I avhandlingen har jag visat hur GCF söker minimera potentiella politiska konflikter genom att minska antalet representationsgrupper i GCF, vilket begränsar möjligheterna för många aktörer att artikulera sina intressen. Samtidigt privilegieras representanter för den privata sektorn som kan hjälpa till att mobilisera privat kapital. GCF privilegierar också tekniskt orienterade organisationer som kan bistå med planering och implementering av projekt medan politiska och kritiska organisationer underordnas. Studie II lyfter fram att i avhandlingen har jag också pekat på hur länders egenansvar är en fråga om maktrelationer där det globala Syd ska ges inflytande över sin egen situation, samtidigt som GCF ser finansialisering som en överordnad princip som kraftigt begränsar ett sådant egenansvar. Både det vetenskapliga perspektivet och marknadsperspektivet i GCF bidrar till en snäv syn på sårbarhet, vilket innebär att normativa, etiska och politiska dimensioner av sårbarhet undertrycks. Det är tydligt att det västerländska vetenskapliga perspektivet dominerar och att GCF anser ursprungsbefolkningars kunskap vara relevant endast som ett komplement.

GCF framställer sig själv som en lyhörd organisation som svarar mot de behov och intressen som artikuleras av olika aktörer och intressen. Utan en explicit diskussion om de

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motsägelser, mångtydigheter, och konflikter som finns i GCF är det dock svårt att tala om en inkluderande styrning. Det blir en skenbart inkluderande styrning som tjänar de vars intressen främjas av att dominanta perspektiv och att ojämlika beroenderelationer görs osynliga.

# Appendix A

Types of documents used in the thesis.

Issuer	Document type	Content
Green Climate Fund	Policies (Operational documents)	Policies provide formal statements about positions taken by the GCF on certain matters, e.g. the Governing Instrument describing the overarching arrangement for the GCF and social safeguards such as the Indigenous Peoples Policy describing how the GCF and its partners should interact with indigenous peoples in GCF funded projects
	Guidelines (Operational documents)	Guidelines contain information on how GCF and partners to the GCF implement policies or provide information to developing countries on how to approach the GCF in the different steps of project development. Guidelines are interesting since they show more of the practices involved in operationalizing overarching principles stated in policies. . Examples of guidelines are Operational guidelines for the Indigenous Peoples Policy and the Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme Guidebook.
	Publications (Operational documents)	Publications can be directed to both applicants, GCF partners and the general public. Documents can describe e.g. how the GCF Private Sector Facility entity works or be technical guidelines on how to present forest and land use in proposals
	Templates (Operational documents)	Templates are sometimes included in guidelines and can be formalized and standardized ways for the GCF to collect information from applicants.
	Board meeting reports (Board documents)	Board Meeting Reports usually end up somewhere between 250-350 pages. In total, thirteen Board Meeting Reports are included in analyses across the studies and some reappear in several studies. The Agendas are included in the meeting reports and will not be discussed in any detail. Board Meeting Reports do not contain verbatim accounts but comments by meeting participants are presented in a retold fashion (see footnote 5). Actors making comments in Board Meeting Reports include inter alia Co-chairs, board members, members from the GCF Secretariat, accredited observers from civil society and private sector, members from GCF sub-units such as the Independent Technical Advisory Panel and members from the Private Sector Facility Group, members from temporary work groups and sometimes invited experts. Board meeting reports are good sources in order to understand what issues are important for the GCF and what different views there are on these issues. which helps to identify potential contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts.

<sup>5</sup> Here is an example of retold comments:

“Two Board members expressed concern that other GCF policy standards were not being followed by AEs. For example, one noted that even though the Indigenous Peoples Policy had been adopted a year earlier, it was difficult to identify it in some funding proposals. They urged the Secretariat and the independent TAP to help ensure that the Information Disclosure Policy and other GCF policies were adhered to in the funding proposals, and that the funding proposals be negatively assessed if these policies were not followed. The concern about the absence of attention to the Indigenous Peoples Policy was also highlighted by an active observer for CSOs.” (GCF/B.22/25, para. 299).

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		One limitation in board meeting reports is the lack of speaker identification. The meeting reports do state if the speaker is a board member, observer, member from Secretariat etc., but they do mention if Board members or Observers making comments represent developed or developing countries. It is a bit peculiar considering the emphasis on equal representation in the GCF and the conflictual field of climate finance, especially between developed and developing countries. One can speculate if this is an attempt to hide potential conflicts to outside observers.
	Action Items (Board document)	Action Items describe matters that need to be dealt with in some ways, e.g. making a final decision on a policy or making a decision on how to continue working with an issue. In Action Item documents the Secretariat and some of its sub-units may present a summary of a report to the Board. Building on the report, the Secretariat recommend the Board to adopt the decision proposed by the Secretariat, often found in an Annex to the document. The Board may take a final decision or request the Secretariat to investigate the issue further. Funding proposals are also categorized as action items but no particular funding proposals are used in the analyses in the studies. The analyses in some of the studies are focused on more general processes around the development of funding proposals. Action Items and affiliated documents such as reports are key documents for understanding knowledge production in the GCF. There you see what matters are important in GCF governance, the problematizations of issues and proposed solutions reflect ontological assumptions and epistemological preferences in the GCF knowledge production.
	Information (Board document)	Documents defined as Information is a varied subtype of document. They can be more descriptive, e.g. they can describe the status of the GCF project portfolio, but they can also present analyses made by the Secretariat and recommendations to the Board based on those analyses. The difference between more analytical Information documents and Action Items seems to be there is no immediate need to make a decision based on the information. The relevance and usefulness of these documents is the same as for Action Items.
	Submissions (Board document)	Submissions are documents containing input from internal (Board members and accredited observers) as well as outside actors. Calls for submissions is a way for the GCF to collect the views of different actors on certain matters. Connected to these submissions are also documents discussing the terms of reference for the submissions. The submissions used in the thesis are connected to the early design process of the Green Climate Fund and the design and review of the GCF accredited observer arrangement. Technically it is the latter ones that are GCF documents and the former ones are documents from the UNFCCC Transitional Committee. GCF submissions include joint statements by 35 civil society organizations regarding the review for the GCF accredited observer arrangement. Submissions are useful as they contain more substantial discussions from different actors compared to retellings in Board meeting reports. Different positions and conflicts are also more easily identified in these more substantial argumentations.
Transitional Committee	Information notes	Information notes are from the UNFCCC secretariat and they clarify COP decisions, terms of references for the design of the GCF, the mandate of the Transitional Committee, arrangements for the Technical Support Unit, and the working arrangements for the Transitional Committee for the design of the Green Climate Fund.

	Meeting summaries	The Meeting Summaries are rather short, 2-8 pages long and summarized by the Co-chairs. The summaries are paragraphs retelling what was discussed under each agenda item. References are made to other documents, sometimes included in Annexes to the summaries. The actions taken by the Transitional Committee Board are concluded at the end of each paragraph, i.e. the Transitional Committee decides on something or requests something to be further investigated.
	Scoping papers	Scoping papers aim to define the issue at hand, i.e. to create a common understanding of a problem and to define the key objects for a certain issue. Scoping papers include retellings of discussions and range from 4-58 pages depending on the complexity of the matter.
	Background notes	Background Notes provide information for discussing agenda items, e.g. overviews how other existing climate funds have solved certain issues such as fiduciary standards and evaluation mechanisms. The length of these documents vary from 2-15 pages depending on the complexity of the issue. Like Action Items in the GCF, these documents are important for understanding the knowledge production in the TC process, i.e. what and how things are problematized.
	Reports	Reports are more elaborate papers than Background Notes. The content is not only collected from other sources as in Background Notes but also partly analysed. Authors of these reports are often members from the Technical Support Unit. The number of pages varies here as well, from 4-10 pages and these documents are central in the TC knowledge making process.
	Presentations from co-facilitators	Presentations from co-facilitators are documents from members of the Transitional Committee board that with help from the Technical Support Unit produce material for the Transitional Committee workshops. They are preliminary suggestions for the initial discussions on each workshop.
	Submissions	Submissions to the Transitional Committee provide views on the design of the GCF from a range of actors, including members of the Transitional Committee, international organs such as UNDP, UNEP, civil society groups (single organizations of joint submissions) and private sector organizations. Submissions were made in relation to various issues during the design of the GCF (UNFCCC, 2011b). As, with GCF submissions, these documents contain longer texts about actors' views that you do not find in other documents. Conflicts are more visible here as well.

# Appendix B

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GCF approved projects to 11 October 2021. Data source: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/projects>

No.	Name	Region	Type	Finance
FP001	Building the Resilience of Wetlands in the Province of Datem del Marañón, Peru	Latin America and the Caribbean	Cross-cutting	Public
FP002	Scaling up the use of Modernized Climate information and Early Warning Systems in Malawi	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP003	Increasing the resilience of ecosystems and communities through the restoration of the productive bases of salinized lands	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP004	Climate Resilient Infrastructure Mainstreaming (CRIM)	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP005	KawiSafi Ventures Fund [off-grid solar power in East-Africa]	Africa	Cross-cutting	Private sector
FP007	Supporting vulnerable communities in Maldives to manage climate change-induced water shortages	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP008	Fiji Urban Water Supply and Wastewater Management Project	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP009	Energy Savings Insurance (ESI) for private energy efficiency investments by Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises	Latin America and the Caribbean	Mitigation	Public
FP010	De-Risking and Scaling-up Investment in Energy Efficient Building Retrofits	Eastern Europe	Mitigation	Public
FP011	Large-scale Ecosystem-based Adaptation in The Gambia: developing a climate-resilient, natural resource-based economy	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP012	Africa Hydromet Program – Strengthening Climate Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa: Mali Country Project	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP013	Improving the resilience of vulnerable coastal communities to climate change related impacts in Vietnam	Asia-Pacific	Cross-cutting	Public
FP014	Climate Adaptation and Mitigation Program For the Aral Sea Basin (CAMP4ASB)	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP015	Tuvalu Coastal Adaptation Project (TCAP)	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP016	Strengthening the resilience of smallholder farmers in the Dry Zone to climate variability and extreme events through an integrated approach to water management	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP017	Climate action and solar energy development programme in the Tarapacá Region in Chile	Latin America and the Caribbean	Mitigation	Private sector
FP018	Scaling-up of Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF) risk reduction in Northern Pakistan	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP019	Priming Financial and Land Use Planning Instruments to Reduce Emissions from Deforestations	Latin America and the Caribbean	Mitigation	Public
FP020	Sustainable Energy Facility for the Eastern Caribbean	Latin America and the Caribbean	Mitigation	Public



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FP021	Senegal Integrated Urban Flood Management Project	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP022	Development of organiculture orchards in degraded environment (DARED)	Africa	Cross-cutting	Public
FP023	Climate Resilient Agriculture in three of the Vulnerable Extreme northern crop growing regions (CRAVE)	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP024	Empower to Adapt: Creating Climate-Change Resilient Livelihoods through Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in Namibia	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP025	GCF-EBRD SEFF Co-financing Programme [deliver climate finance to the private sector at scale through Partner Financial Institutions across 10 countries].	Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia-Pacific	Cross-cutting	Private sector
FP026	Sustainable Landscapes in Eastern Madagascar	Africa	Cross-cutting	Private sector
FP027	Universal Green Energy Access Programme (UGEAP)	Africa	Mitigation	Private sector
FP028	MSME [micro, small and medium enterprises] Business Loan Program for GHG Emission Reduction	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Private sector
FP033	Accelerating the transformational shift to a low-carbon economy in the Republic of Mauritius	Africa	Mitigation	Public
FP034	Building Resilient Communities, Wetland Ecosystems and Associated Catchments in Uganda	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP035	Climate Information Services for Resilient Development Planning in Vanuatu (Van-CIS-RDP)	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP036	Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Investment Program	Asia-Pacific	Cross-cutting	Public
FP037	Integrated Flood Management to Enhance Climate Resilience of the Vaisigano River Catchment in Samoa	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP039	GCF-EBRD Egypt Renewable Energy Financing Framework	Africa	Mitigation	Private sector
FP040	Tajikistan: Scaling Up Hydropower Sector Climate Resilience	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP041	Simiyu Climate Resilient Project	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP042	Irrigation development and adaptation of irrigated agriculture to climate change in semi-arid Morocco	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP043	The Saïss Water Conservation Project	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP044	Tina River Hydropower Development Project	Asia-Pacific	Cross-cutting	Public
FP045	Ground Water Recharge and Solar Micro Irrigation to Ensure Food Security and Enhance Resilience in Vulnerable Tribal Areas of Odisha	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP046	Renewable Energy Program #1 - Solar [Mongolia]	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Private sector
FP047	GCF-EBRD Kazakhstan Renewables Framework	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Private sector
FP048	Low Emissions and Climate Resilient Agriculture Risk Sharing Facility	Latin America and the Caribbean	Cross-cutting	Private sector
FP049	Building the climate resilience of food insecure smallholder farmers through integrated management of climate risk (R4)	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP050	Bhutan for life [preventing deforestation and preserving resources]	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP051	Scaling-up Investment in Low-Carbon Public Buildings [Bosnia-Herzegovina]	Eastern Europe	Mitigation	Public

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FP052	Sustainable and Climate Resilient Connectivity for Nauru	Asia-Pacific	Cross-cutting	Public
FP053	Enhancing climate change adaptation in the North coast and Nile Delta Regions in Egypt	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP056	Scaling up climate resilient water management practices for vulnerable communities in La Mojana	Latin America and the Caribbean	Adaptation	Public
FP058	Responding to the increasing risk of drought: building gender-responsive resilience of the most vulnerable communities	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP059	Climate Resilient Water Sector in Grenada (G-CREWS)	Latin America and the Caribbean	Adaptation	Public
FP060	Water Sector Resilience Nexus for Sustainability in Barbados (WSRN S-Barbados)	Latin America and the Caribbean	Cross-cutting	Public
FP061	Integrated physical adaptation and community resilience through an enhanced direct access pilot in the public, private, and civil society sectors of three Eastern Caribbean small island developing states	Latin America and the Caribbean	Adaptation	Public
FP062	Poverty, Reforestation, Energy and Climate Change Project (PROEZA)	Latin America and the Caribbean	Cross-cutting	Public
FP063	Promoting private sector investments in energy efficiency in the industrial sector and in Paraguay	Latin America and the Caribbean	Mitigation	Public
FP064	Promoting risk mitigation instruments and finance for renewable energy and energy efficiency investments	Latin America and the Caribbean	Mitigation	Public
FP066	Pacific Resilience Project Phase II for RMI	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP067	Building climate resilience of vulnerable and food insecure communities through capacity strengthening and livelihood diversification in mountainous regions of Tajikistan	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP068	Scaling-up Multi-Hazard Early Warning System and the Use of Climate Information in Georgia	Eastern Europe	Adaptation	Public
FP069	Enhancing adaptive capacities of coastal communities, especially women, to cope with climate change induced salinity	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP070	Global Clean Cooking Program – Bangladesh	Asia-Pacific	Cross-cutting	Public
FP071	Scaling Up Energy Efficiency for Industrial Enterprises in Vietnam	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Public
FP072	Strengthening climate resilience of agricultural livelihoods in Agro-Ecological Regions I and II in Zambia	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP073	Strengthening Climate Resilience of Rural Communities in Northern Rwanda	Africa	Cross-cutting	Public
FP074	Africa Hydromet Program – Strengthening Climate Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa: Burkina Faso Country Project	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP075	Institutional Development of the State Agency for Hydrometeorology of Tajikistan	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP076	Climate-Friendly Agribusiness Value Chains Sector Project	Asia-Pacific	Cross-cutting	Public
FP077	Ulaanbaatar Green Affordable Housing and Resilient Urban Renewal Project (AHURP)	Asia-Pacific	Cross-cutting	Public
FP078	Acumen Resilient Agriculture Fund (ARAF) [Supporting agribusinesses that enhance the climate resilience of smallholder farmers]	Africa	Adaptation	Private sector
FP080	Zambia Renewable Energy Financing Framework	Africa	Mitigation	Private sector

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FP081	Line of Credit for Solar rooftop segment for commercial, industrial and residential housing sectors	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Private sector
FP082	Catalyzing Climate Finance (Shandong Green Development Fund) [Catalysing private finance to maximize mitigation and adaptation impacts]	Asia-Pacific	Cross-cutting	Public
SAP001*	Improving rangeland and ecosystem management practices of smallholder farmers under conditions of climate change in Sesfontein, Fransfontein, and Warmquelle areas of the Republic of Namibia	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP083	Indonesia Geothermal Resource Risk Mitigation Project	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Public
FP084	Enhancing climate resilience of India's coastal communities	Asia-Pacific	Cross-cutting	Public
FP085	Green BRT Karachi [Building a zero-emissions bus rapid transit (BRT) system]	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Public
FP086	Green Cities Facility [Enabling the transition of cities to low-carbon, climate-resilient urban development]	Eastern Europe, Asia-Pacific, Africa	Cross-cutting	Public
FP087	Building livelihood resilience to climate change in the upper basins of Guatemala's highlands	Latin America and the Caribbean	Adaptation	Public
FP089	Upscaling climate resilience measures in the dry corridor agroecosystems of El Salvador (RECLIMA)	Latin America and the Caribbean	Cross-cutting	Public
FP090	Tonga Renewable Energy Project under the Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Investment Program	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Public
FP091	South Tarawa Water Supply Project	Asia-Pacific	Cross-cutting	Public
FP092	Programme for integrated development and adaptation to climate change in the Niger Basin (PIDACC/NB)	Africa	Cross-cutting	Public
FP093	Yeelen Rural Electrification Project in Burkina Faso	Africa	Mitigation	Public
FP094	Ensuring climate resilient water supplies in the Comoros Islands	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP095	Transforming Financial Systems for Climate	Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean	Cross-cutting	Private sector
FP096	DRC Green Mini-Grid Program [development of three solar green mini-grid pilot projects]	Africa	Mitigation	Private sector
FP097	Productive Investment Initiative for Adaptation to Climate Change (CAMBio II)	Latin America and the Caribbean	Adaptation	Private sector
FP098	DBSA Climate Finance Facility	Africa	Cross-cutting	Private sector
FP099	Climate Investor One [Providing financing to develop renewable energy projects in regions with power deficits]	Africa, Asia-Pacific/Latin America and the Caribbean	Mitigation	Private sector
SAP002*	Climate services and diversification of climate sensitive livelihoods to empower food insecure and vulnerable communities in the Kyrgyz Republic.	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
SAP003*	Enhancing climate resilience of the water sector in Bahrain	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
SAP004*	Energy Efficient Consumption Loan Programme [loans to energy efficiency heating appliances and housing products]	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Private sector
FP100	REDD-PLUS results-based payments for results achieved by Brazil in the Amazon biome in 2014 and 2015	Latin America and the Caribbean	Mitigation	Public

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FP101	Resilient Rural Belize (Be-Resilient)	Latin America and the Caribbean	Adaptation	Public
FP102	Mali solar rural electrification project	Africa	Mitigation	Public
FP103	Promotion of Climate-Friendly Cooking: Kenya and Senegal	Africa	Mitigation	Public
FP105	BOAD Climate Finance Facility to Scale Up Solar Energy Investments in Francophone West Africa LDCs	Africa	Mitigation	Private sector
FP106	Embedded Generation Investment Programme (EGIP) [support the implementation of renewable energy projects]	Africa	Mitigation	Private sector
SAP005*	Enhanced climate resilience of rural communities in central and north Benin through the implementation of ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) in forest and agricultural landscapes	Africa	Adaptation	Public
SAP006*	Building resilience of communities living in landscapes threatened under climate change through an ecosystems-based adaptation approach	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP107	Supporting Climate Resilience and Transformational Change in the Agriculture Sector in Bhutan	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP108	Transforming the Indus Basin with Climate Resilient Agriculture and Water Management	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP109	Safeguarding rural communities and their physical and economic assets from climate induced disasters in Timor-Leste	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP110	Ecuador REDD-plus RBP for results period 2014	Latin America and the Caribbean	Mitigation	Public
FP111	Promoting climate-resilient forest restoration and silviculture for the sustainability of water-related ecosystem services	Latin America and the Caribbean	Cross-cutting	Public
FP112	Addressing Climate Vulnerability in the Water Sector (ACWA) in the Marshall Islands	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP113	TWENDE: Towards Ending Drought Emergencies: Ecosystem Based Adaptation in Kenya's Arid and Semi-Arid Rangelands	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP114	Program on Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa (AFAWA): Financing Climate Resilient Agricultural Practices in Ghana	Africa	Cross-cutting	Private sector
FP115	Espejo de Tarapacá [Providing stable, 24-hour baseload energy]	Latin America and the Caribbean	Cross-cutting	Private sector
SAP007*	Integrated Climate Risk Management for Food Security and Livelihoods in Zimbabwe focusing on Masvingo and Rushinga Districts	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP116	Carbon Sequestration through Climate Investment in Forests and Rangelands in Kyrgyz Republic (CS-FOR)	Asia-Pacific	Cross-cutting	Public
FP117	Implementation of the Lao PDR Emission Reductions Programme through improved governance and sustainable forest landscape management	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Public
FP118	Building a Resilient Churia Region in Nepal (BRCRN)	Asia-Pacific	Cross-cutting	Public
FP119	Water Banking and Adaptation of Agriculture to Climate Change in Northern Gaza	Asia-Pacific	Cross-cutting	Public
FP120	Chile REDD-plus results-based payments for results period 2014-2016	Latin America and the Caribbean	Mitigation	Public
FP121	REDD+ Results-based payments in Paraguay for the period 2015-2017	Latin America and the Caribbean	Mitigation	Public

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FP122	Blue Action Fund (BAF): GCF Ecosystem Based Adaptation Programme in the Western Indian Ocean	Africa	Adaptation	Public
SAP008*	Extended Community Climate Change Project-Flood (ECCCP-Flood)	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
SAP009*	Building resilience of urban populations with ecosystem-based solutions in Lao PDR	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
SAP010*	Multi-Hazard Impact-Based Forecasting and Early Warning System for the Philippines	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
SAP011*	Climate-resilient food security for women and men smallholders in Mozambique through integrated risk management	Africa	Adaptation	Public
SAP012*	Inclusive Green Financing for Climate Resilient and Low Emission Smallholder Agriculture	Africa	Cross-cutting	Public
FP124	Strengthening Climate Resilience of Subsistence Farmers and Agricultural Plantation Communities residing in the vulnerable river basins, watershed areas and downstream of the Knuckles Mountain Range Catchment of Sri Lanka	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP125	Strengthening the resilience of smallholder agriculture to climate change-induced water insecurity in the Central Highlands and South-Central Coast regions of Vietnam	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP126	Increased climate resilience of rural households and communities through the rehabilitation of production landscapes in selected localities of the Republic of Cuba (IRES)	Latin America and the Caribbean	Cross-cutting	Public
FP127	Building Climate Resilience of Vulnerable Agricultural Livelihoods in Southern Zimbabwe	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP128	Arbaro Fund – Sustainable Forestry Fund	Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa	Mitigation	Private sector
SAP013	Scaling Smart, Solar, Energy Access Microgrids in Haiti	Latin America and the Caribbean	Cross-cutting	Private sector
FP129	Afghanistan Rural Energy Market Transformation Initiative – Strengthening Resilience of Livelihoods Through Sustainable Energy Access	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Public
FP130	Indonesia REDD-plus RBP for results period 2014-2016	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Public
FP131	Improving Climate Resilience of Vulnerable Communities and Ecosystems in the Gandaki River Basin, Nepal	Asia-Pacific	Cross-cutting	Public
FP132	Enabling Implementation of Forest Sector Reform in Georgia to Reduce GHG Emissions from Forest Degradation	Eastern Europe	Mitigation	Public
FP133	Resilience to hurricanes in the building sector in Antigua and Barbuda	Latin America and the Caribbean	Adaptation	Public
FP134	Colombia REDD+ Results-based Payments for results period 2015-2016	Latin America and the Caribbean	Mitigation	Public
FP135	Ecosystem-based Adaptation in the Indian Ocean – EBA IO	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP136	Resilient Landscapes and Livelihoods Project	Africa	Cross-cutting	Public
FP137	Ghana Shea Landscape Emission Reductions Project	Africa	Cross-cutting	Public

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FP138	ASER Solar Rural Electrification Project	Africa	Mitigation	Public
FP139	Building resilience in the face of climate change within traditional rain fed agricultural and pastoral systems in Sudan	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP140	High Impact Programme for the Corporate Sector	Asia-Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe	Mitigation	Private sector
SAP014*	Forest resilience of Armenia, enhancing adaptation and rural green growth via mitigation	Eastern Europe	Cross-cutting	Public
SAP015*	Promoting zero-deforestation cocoa production for reducing emissions in Côte d'Ivoire (PRO-MIRE)	Africa	Mitigation	Public
SAP016*	Fiji Agrophotovoltaic Project in Ovalau	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Private sector
FP141	Improving Adaptive Capacity and Risk Management of Rural communities in Mongolia	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP142	Argentina REDD-plus RBP for results period 2014-2016	Latin America and the Caribbean	Mitigation	Public
FP143	Planting Climate Resilience in Rural Communities of the Northeast (PCRP)	Latin America and the Caribbean	Cross-cutting	Public
FP144	Costa Rica REDD-plus Results-Based Payments for 2014 and 2015	Latin America and the Caribbean	Mitigation	Public
FP145	RELIVE – Resilient LIVelihoods of vulnerable smallholder farmers in the Mayan landscapes and the Dry Corridor of Guatemala	Latin America and the Caribbean	Adaptation	Public
FP146	Bio-CLIMA: Integrated climate action to reduce deforestation and strengthen resilience in BOSAWÁS and Rio San Juan Biospheres	Latin America and the Caribbean	Mitigation	Public
FP147	Enhancing Climate Information and Knowledge Services for resilience in 5 island countries of the Pacific Ocean	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP148	Participation in Energy Access Relief Facility ("EARF")	Africa	Mitigation	Private sector
FP149	Green Climate Financing Facility for Local Financial Institutions in Latin-America	Latin America and the Caribbean	Mitigation	Private sector
FP150	Promoting private sector investment through large scale adoption of energy saving technologies and equipment for Textile and Ready-made Garment (RMG) sectors of Bangladesh	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Private sector
FP151	Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF Global) – Technical Assistance (TA) Facility	Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Private sector
FP152	Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF Global) – Equity [to catalyze long-term climate investment primarily from the private sector]	Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe	Mitigation	Private sector
FP153	Mongolia Green Finance Corporation [decreasing CO2 emissions at the household and business level]	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Private sector
SAP107*	Climate proofing food production investments in Imbo and Moso basins in the Republic of Burundi	Africa	Adaptation	Public

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SAP108*	Enhancing Climate Information Systems for Resilient Development in Liberia (Liberia CIS)	Africa	Adaptation	Public
SAP109*	Gums for Adaptation and Mitigation in Sudan (GAMS): Enhancing adaptive capacity of local communities and restoring carbon sink potential of the Gum Arabic belt, expanding Africa's Great Green Wall	Africa	Cross-cutting	Public
FP154	Mongolia: Aimags and Soums Green Regional Development Investment Program (ASDIP)	Asia-Pacific	Cross-cutting	Public
FP155	Building resilience to cope with climate change in Jordan through improving water use efficiency in the agriculture sector (BRCCJ)	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP156	ASEAN Catalytic Green Finance Facility (ACGF): Green Recovery Program [recovery following COVID-19]	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Public
FP157	Coastal Resilience to Climate Change in Cuba through Ecosystem Based Adaptation - "MI COSTA"	Latin America and the Caribbean	Adaptation	Public
FP158	Ecosystem-Based Adaptation and Mitigation in Botswana's Communal Rangelands	Africa	Cross-cutting	Public
FP159	PREFOREST CONGO - Project to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from forests in five departments in the Republic of Congo	Africa	Mitigation	Public
FP160	Monrovia Metropolitan Climate Resilience Project	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP161	Building Regional Resilience through Strengthened Meteorological, Hydrological and Climate Services in the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) Member Countries	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP162	The Africa Integrated Climate Risk Management Programme: Building the resilience of smallholder farmers to climate change impacts in 7 Sahelian Countries of the Great Green Wall (GGW)	Africa	Cross-cutting	Public
FP163	Sustainable Renewables Risk Mitigation Initiative (SRMI) Facility	Africa, Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Public
FP164	Green Growth Equity Fund	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Private sector
SAP020*	Climate resilient food security for farming households across the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM)	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
SAP021*	Community-based Landscape Management for Enhanced Climate Resilience and Reduction of Deforestation in Critical Watersheds	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Public
SAP022*	Enhancing Multi-Hazard Early Warning System to increase resilience of Uzbekistan communities to climate change induced hazards	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
SAP023*	River Restoration for Climate Change Adaptation (RIOS)	Latin America and the Caribbean	Cross-cutting	Public
FP165	Building Climate Resilient Safer Islands in the Maldives	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP166	Light Rail Transit for the Greater Metropolitan Area (GAM) [Costa Rica]	Latin America and the Caribbean	Mitigation	Public
FP167	Transforming Eastern Province through Adaptation [climate-resilient agriculture in Rwanda]	Africa	Cross-cutting	Public
FP168	Leveraging Energy Access Finance (LEAF) Framework [renewable energy solutions to Sub-Saharan Africa]	Africa	Mitigation	Private sector
FP169	Climate change adaptation solutions for Local Authorities in the Federated States of Micronesia	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public

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FP170	Enhancing climate resilience in Thailand through effective water management and sustainable agriculture	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP171	Enhancing Early Warning Systems to build greater resilience to hydro-meteorological hazards in Timor-Leste	Asia-Pacific	Adaptation	Public
FP172	Mitigating GHG emission through modern, efficient and climate friendly clean cooking solutions (CCS) [Nepal]	Asia-Pacific	Mitigation	Public
FP173	The Amazon Bioeconomy Fund: Unlocking private capital by valuing bioeconomy products and services with climate mitigation and adaptation results in the Amazon	Latin America and the Caribbean	Cross-cutting	Public
FP174	Ecosystem-based Adaptation to increase climate resilience in the Central American Dry Corridor and the Arid Zones of the Dominican Republic	Latin America and the Caribbean	Adaptation	Public
FP175	Enhancing community resilience and water security in the Upper Athi River Catchment Area, Kenya	Africa	Adaptation	Public
FP176	Hydro-agricultural development with smart agriculture practices resilient to climate change in Niger	Africa	Cross-cutting	Public
FP177	Cooling Facility [provide cooling solutions in nine countries]	Africa, Asia-Pacific	Cross-cutting	Public
FP178	Desert to Power G5 Sahel Facility [enabling environment to facilitate private sector funding for solar technological innovations and to ensure sustainability of the clean energy sector in five African countries]	Africa	Mitigation	Private sector
FP179	Tanzania Agriculture Climate Adaptation Technology Deployment Programme (TACATDP)	Africa	Adaptation	Private sector
FP180	Global Fund for Coral Reefs Investment Window [aims to address critical financing and private investment barriers centred around the blue economy]	Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean	Adaptation	Private sector
FP181	CRAFT - Catalytic Capital for First Private Investment Fund for Adaptation Technologies in Developing Countries	Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean	Adaptation	Private sector

\* Simplified Approval Process.



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Global climate governance is characterised by many contentious issues that are difficult to agree on. The climate organizations mandated by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to manage climate issues are still expected to operationalize climate actions in a satisfying way, which means that many contentious issues are passed along to these organizations. However, climate organizations often take on a technical role, making the contentiousness of climate issues invisible. The present thesis investigates one of the major organizations within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Green Climate Fund. The aim of the thesis is to make the contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts around the operationalization of different issues in the Green Climate Fund visible and to analyse how the management of these contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts by the Green Climate Fund affects which aspects of global climate finance governance issues are emphasized or subordinated.